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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• In 2011, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) proposed a strong increase in the
number judges at the European General Court (EGC), to deal with the latter’s
substantial backlog. At the time, the EGC began to implement a more modest and
progressive strategy, based on limited, targeted and reversible increase of
personnel (as recommended by the author in 2011). Four years later, at the end
of 2015, after a very long and complex debate, the EU institutions decided to
double the number of judges in the EGC. During the same period of time, the
judicial backlog had been more or less liquidated. According to various press
sources, some sitting judges were beginning to look for work (not to speak of the
armada of new ones due to arrive in 2016). The EGC’s management strategy had
evidently delivered, notwithstanding the addition of merely 9 additional legal
secretaries and without an additional judge. Moreover there was still an impor-
tant margin within which results could continue to be improved.
• In a comparative approach, this report examines the reforms implemented by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from 2000 to 2016. During this period,
the ECtHR had to address a far greater backlog than that faced by the EGC. The
strategy for reform it followed was completely different from that followed by
the EU, being far more global, economical, and flexible. This paper aims to
describe and analyse the ways in which the ECtHR’s backlog was strongly reduced
and to draw some lessons for the management of the EU courts.
• After 1989, due to multiple factors, the ECtHR underwent enormous and simulta-
neous changes. The Council of Europe was enlarged to include a number of new
states some of which were confronted with serious challenges in the field of human
rights. The scope of the protection of human rights was simultaneously enlarged.
Taken together it was a kind of perfect legal storm. From 2000 to 2012, the number
of applications before the ECtHR rose from 10,000 to 65,000. During the same
period, the number of pending applications went from 16,000 to 162,000.
• The ECtHR launched an in depth reflection process. Internal papers were drafted.
External experts were consulted. External contributions were encouraged. Inter-
national conferences were organized. Multiple technical analyses emerged. This
allowed a global and long term analysis to be adopted. This also stimulated
various costs/benefits analyses.
• The reform process was also extremely open. Internal and external reports were
published. Official documents were made public on the internet. All analyses
were debated in conferences where dozens of experts were present.
• The ECtHR implemented, managerial reforms before structural ones. This mini-
mized costs and amplified flexibility. Managerial measures could also be adapted,
corrected or withdrawn in the light of experience.4
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)• Increases in the number of personnel came about progressively, not automati-
cally, and were not irreversible. This allowed for limited and targeted increases of
personnel, which could be withdrawn or re-effected after the targeted problem
had been addressed. This also allowed the stable part of the personnel to
increase.
• In a nutshell, the reform of the ECtHR was everything that the EGC’s was not.
Indeed, the two reforms are more or less of a totally different character. So far as
process is concerned, in the ECJ’s case there was no in depth preparation, no
consultation of external experts or interested parties, no costs/benefits analysis,
no impact assessment, and more or less no public debate. This could surprise
observers. First, the Council of Europe, a traditional intergovernmental organiza-
tion, appeared to manage change in a far more democratic and transparent
manner than the EU, with its transnational character and safeguards meant to
involve the Member States’ citizens. Second, there had been a quite serious and
open preparatory debate during the earlier reform of the EU Court of Justice’s
statute in the framework of the Nice Treaty. The new reform thus reflects a dete-
rioration of the top management of the European Court of Justice, and generally
of the other EU institutions.
• The opposition between the two reforms is also complete in so far as the
substance is concerned. The result of the doubling of the General Court is to
create a massive increase in the number of judges and of the staff attached to
their cabinets. This increase is neither progressive nor reversible, and allows for
no assessment by way of trial and error. Moreover, it is limited to the top tier of
the institution, which is both more costly and more unstable. The difficulty of
managing the biggest international court in the world has not been examined.
Finally, the efficiency of the changes is to be evaluated after the money has been
spent, and not beforehand.
• The doubling of the number of judges of the EGC has now become the new
symbol of a generally obese EU institutional system. The Treaty of Nice had
produced an obese Commission.The Treaty of Lisbon had produced an obese
Parliament (and even Central Bank and Court of Auditors). Now the EU also has
an obese Court of Justice. The primacy of representation over efficiency has led
to a system where the top tier of each institution is manifestly excessive as
compared to the tasks it is required to discharge (sometimes even to the detri-
ment of the other tiers). This not only costs a lot of money but makes these insti-
tutions more difficult to manage. It is high time that the leaders in charge of EU
affairs rediscover the immortal words of Mies van der Rohe. In EU politics, as in
architecture or management, “less is more”.5
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) proposed a strong increase of the judges
of the European General Court, to deal with a substantial backlog. At the time, the
author indicated that it would be preferable to implement a careful and progressive
strategy, with internal reforms and small targeted increases of personnel1. A little bit
later, the General Court began to implement this strategy. Four years later, at the
end of 2015, after a very long and complex debate, the EU institutions decided to
double the number of judges in the European General Court (EGC). According to
various press sources, the judicial backlog had more or less disappeared, and some
sitting judges were beginning to look for work (not to speak of the armada of new
ones due to arrive in 2016). The recommended progressive strategy to deal with the
backlog had evidently delivered, with the addition of only 9 additional legal secre-
taries and not a single additional judge. Moreover there was still an important
margin left in which to improve results2.
By contrast it is interesting to examine the reform implemented by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) since the end of the 1990s. During this period, the
ECtHR had to deal with a massive backlog. The strategy for reform it followed was
completely different than that followed by the EU, being far more global, econom-
ical, and flexible. This paper aims to describe and analyse the way in which the
backlog of the ECHtR evolved and by which means and methods by which its situa-
tion has improved3.
The context is, of course, completely different. After 1989, the ECtHR went through
a considerable enlargement (more important than the EU’s in many aspects).
Between 1989 and 1996, the number of State Parties to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) went from 22 to 40, reaching the current number of 47 in 2007.
This modified the role of the Court in many ways. A huge reorganization of the Court
was more or less simultaneously launched by Protocol n° 11. The new State Parties
did not always have a strong human rights culture. The number of new applications
rose considerably. The number of languages increased. The backlog grew and
became extremely worrying. All of these elements combined to clog the system.
Paradoxically, at least at first sight, Protocol n° 11 to the Convention has been
1 See F. Dehousse (with the collaboration of M. Rouland), “The reform of the EU Courts – The need of a
management approach”, Egmont / Tepsa, 2011 [The reform of EU Courts I].
2 See F. Dehousse (with the collaboration of B. Marsicola), “The reform of the EU Courts – Abandoning the
management approach by doubling the General Court, Egmont / Tepsa, 2016 [The reform of EU Courts II].
3 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the judicial institution of the European Union. It
comprehends both the Court of Justice (ECJ) and the General Court (EGC), after the suppression of the Civil
Service Tribunal. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the court established by the Council of
Europe to control the implementation by the State Parties of the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR).6
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when the need of filters had become far clearer.
The judicial mission of the EU Courts and the ECtHR are also not the same. Human
rights cover an extremely broad scope of activities. The national legal and factual
context, sometimes very complex, must be understood. On the other side, the EU
has developed an extremely heavy corpus of secondary legislation. The geographical
space covered by the ECHR is broader and the national systems included therein
more heterogeneous. However, in many aspects, the systems are similar. Further-
more, both judicial systems are of international nature, which makes their reform
quite more complicated.
With the adoption of a series of measures and various changes in working methods,
the ECtHR has managed to solve many of its problems, halving the number of
pending applications in just few years. Despite the great differences between them
this experience can offer very interesting lessons for the European Union’s courts. As
we shall see, the strategy adopted by the ECtHR was completely different, in fact the
complete opposite of the CJEU’s. In a nutshell, all parties involved were consulted at
length, the process was completely transparent, a very great variety of measures
were contemplated, and finally the increase of judges was the only one excluded.
The present report constitutes a synthesis. It does NOT aim to explain the general
functioning of the ECtHR, or constitute a comprehensive analysis of its reforms. More
modestly, it tries to examine the great trends, the measures taken and the method-
ology used to take the decisions. It also tries to draw some conclusions for future
changes in the EU courts system. This approach, very different, and in many aspects
opposite than the European Court of Justice’s, can also offer many valuable lessons
in judicial management for the reform of the national judicial systems.
The report will first provide a quick reminder about the ECtHR (§ 1). It will detail the
growth of the backlog and its causes (§ 2). It will describe the different international
conferences that were essential for the reform process (§ 4). Then it will analyse all
the adopted measures (§ 4) and their results (§ 5). Finally, it will evoke other possible
measures which have already been debated but not implemented yet (§ 6).7
1. THE ECHR TODAY: A REMINDER4
1.1. The organisation of the Court
The reader will find here a very brief reminder of the functioning of the Court,
according to rules currently in force.
The Court has jurisdiction over all matters concerning the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Convention and the Protocols. The applications can be brought before
the Court by a State Party against another State Party or by physical persons, NGOs
or groups of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention by a
State Party.
To be admissible, an application must meet a number of criteria. Applicants can file
an application before the ECtHR only after having exhausted the domestic remedies
available, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision
was taken. In addition, applications shall not be anonymous and shall not regard the
same as a matter upon which the Court has already adjudicated, they shall be
compatible with the provisions of the Convention, shall not be manifestly ill-founded
and the applicant has to have suffered from a significant disadvantage, with some
exceptions.
The Court is composed by 47 judges, one per State Party, elected by the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe by a majority of votes cast from a list of three
candidates nominated by the State Party. As a result of an amendment introduced
by Protocol n° 14, judges are elected for a single period of nine years and may not be
re-elected. They can sit in different formations: alone as a single judge, in a
Committee of three judges, a Chamber of seven judges (that may be reduced to five)
and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court has two official languages:
English and French.
The Plenary Court elects its President and one or two Vice-Presidents for a renew-
able period of three years; establishes Chambers and elects their Presidents; adopts
the Rules of the Court; elects the Registrar and one or more Deputy Registrars.
The President directs the work and administration of the Court. S/he represents the
Court and is responsible for its relations with the authorities of the Council of Europe;
s/he presides at plenary meetings of the Court, meetings of the Grand Chamber and
meetings of the panel of five judges. S/he is assisted in his tasks by a Bureau
composed of the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents of the Court and the
4 There are many excellent comments on the ECHR: see for example B. Rainey, E. Wicks, and C. Ovey, The
European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed., 2014; F. Sudre, Droit européen et inter-
national des droits de l’homme, 12th ed., P.U.F., 2015.8
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extra-judicial matter which falls within his or her competence.
The Registrar assists the Court in the performance of its functions and is responsible
for the organisation and activities of the Registry under the authority of the President
of the Court; s/he also holds the archives and is in charge of external communication.
S/he is elected by the Plenary Court for five renewable years and is assisted by one
or more Deputy Registrars. S/he can be dismissed by the Plenary Court upon initia-
tive of one of the judges. The Registrar draws up General Instructions for the opera-
tion of the Registry, which are approved by the President of the Court.
The Registry provides legal and administrative support to the Court in the exercise of
its judicial functions; its functions and organisation are laid down in the Rules of
Court. It is composed of lawyers, administrative and technical staff and translators.
There are in 2016 some 640 staff members of the Registry, 270 lawyers and 370
other support staff.5 Registry staff members are staff members of the Council of
Europe and are subject to the Council of Europe’s Staff Regulations. They are
appointed by the Registrar, under the authority of the President of the Court; unlike
other international jurisdictions, judges do not have personal chambers.
The Registry is organised in five sections, in their turn divided into 31 case-processing
divisions, according to the lawyers’ knowledge of languages and of the different legal
systems, each assisted by an administrative team. The lawyers’ task is to prepare files
and analytical notes for the judges; they also correspond with the parties on proce-
dural matters. The registry also includes the Filtering Section, a Jurisconsult in charge
of the Grand Chamber Registry, research and Case-Law Information, and a Common
Services Directorate.6
According to Article 50 of the Convention, the Council of Europe bears the expendi-
ture of the Court. At present, the Court does not have a separate budget, but
partakes in the general budget of the Council of Europe. It is therefore subject to the
approval of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the course of their
examination of the overall Council of Europe budget. The Council of Europe is
financed by the contributions of its 47 State Parties, which are fixed according to
scales taking into account population size and gross national product.
The Court’s budget for 2016 amounts to 71,165,500 euros.7 This covers Judges’
remuneration, staff salaries and operational expenditure (translation, interpreta-
tion, information technology, official journeys, publications, representational
expenditure, legal aid, fact-finding missions, etc). It does not include expenditure on
the building and infrastructure. The Registry has a Budget and Finance Office, which
5 Information available on the Website of the Court,: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/
howitworks&c=#newComponent_1346157759256_pointer.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.9
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)deals with the day-to day management of the Court’s budget, under the authority of
the Registrar.8
1.2. Protocols to the Convention
The Convention is a living instrument. Since 1950 it has undergone amendment
through the adoption of protocols, some of which are of an essential nature.
Basically, there have been two phases in the ECHR’s history.
Protocol n° 11 to the Convention, entered into force on 1 November 1998, is essen-
tial in defining these the two phases. It replaced the original two-tier structure that
comprised the Commission on Human Rights and the part-time Court by a single, full-
time Court, which has automatic jurisdiction. The Protocol put an end to the Commis-
sion’s filtering function, and enabled individual applicants to bring their cases directly
before the Court. It also put an end to the judicial powers of the Committee of Minis-
ters, which decided on applications that were admissible and were not referred to
the Court. The Committee of Ministers is now competent to ensure that State Parties
execute the Court’s judgments issued against them9.
Under Protocol n° 11, the Court sits in Chambers of seven judges. Manifestly ill-
founded cases may be declared inadmissible by a unanimous vote of a committee of
three judges. If the Court declares the application admissible, it will pursue the
examination of the case, and also place itself at the disposal of the parties with a view
to securing a friendly settlement of the matter.
Protocol n° 11 introduced the system according to which, within three months from
the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party to the case might, in exceptional
cases, request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. When the request is
accepted, the resulting judgment of the Grand Chamber is final. Otherwise,
judgments of Chambers become final when the parties declare that they will not
request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, or have made no request
for reference three months after the date of the judgment, or, if such a request is
made, when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer.10
Since the entry into force of Protocol n° 11, Protocol n° 14 has had the greatest
impact on the functioning of the Court. Signed in 2004, it only entered fully into force
in June 2010, after long awaited ratification by the Russian Federation. In the period
pending its entry into force, 18 State Parties agreed nonetheless to give binding force
8 Ibidem.
9 For a good synthetic description of the system’s evolution, see E. Fribergh and R. Liddell, From protocol n°
11 to 2025 – A Court in constant change, in El Tribunal Europeao de Derechos Humanos, 2015, Tirant le
Blanch, 493-507.
10 For an historical and insider overview of the adoption of the Protocol see M. Rund, The Court: Historical
framework, in Proceedings, Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights,
Oslo, 7-8 April 2014, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/
Publications/Proceedings-Oslo-2014.pdf,  p. 23 ss.10
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)to its most relevant provisions of the Protocol, by ratifying Protocol n° 14bis. This
instrument allowed for the provisional application of single judge formations and the
new competence for Committees of three judges to rule on the merits of repetitive
applications.11
The main changes introduced by Protocol n° 14 are: the creation of Single Judge
formations competent to declare inadmissible or strike out individual applications
while extending the competence of Committees of three judges to cover repetitive
cases; the introduction of a new admissibility criterion consisting of the proof of
having suffered from a significant disadvantage as a consequence of the alleged
violation of the Convention; the affirmation of the practice of ruling simultaneously
on admissibility and merits as the norm (even though this was already the Court’s
practice due to a liberal interpretation of the Convention); the possibility for the
Committee of Ministers to request the Court to give an authentic interpretation of
judgments; extended access to the instrument of friendly settlements; the possibility
for the Committee of Ministers to request the Court to file infringement proceedings
for non-compliance with Court judgments; the extension of the term of the judges’
mandate to nine years, non-renewable; an amendment implying the possibility of
the accession of the EU to the Convention.
In 2013, the Committee of Ministers adopted Protocol n° 15 to the Convention,
which will enter into force as soon as all the State Parties to the Convention have
signed and ratified it. To date, Protocol n° 15 has been ratified by 26 States and
Protocol n° 16 by 6.
The main innovations brought by Protocol n° 15 are the references to the principle
of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the Preamble of the
Convention, and the introduction of stricter rules for the admissibility of applica-
tions. In particular, the time limit within which an application must be made to the
Court is shortened from six to four months and the significant disadvantage admissi-
bility criterion is amended to remove the safeguard preventing rejection of an appli-
cation that has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. In addition, the
Protocol amends the Convention by removing the right of the parties to a case to
object to a Chamber relinquishing jurisdiction over it in favour of the Grand Chamber
and by modifying the age requirements of candidates to the post of judges.
Finally, in 2013, Protocol n° 16 was adopted by the Committee of Ministers. This new
protocol will allow the highest courts and tribunals of State Parties to request the
Court to deliver advisory opinions on questions of principle relating to the interpre-
tation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the
protocols thereto. The possible implications of these two last protocols, net yet
entered into force, on the Court’s caseload have yet to be evaluated.
11 See A. Mowbray, Cases, Materials, and Commentary on the European Convention on Human Rights,
Oxford, 2007.11
2. THE BACKLOG: STATISTICS AND CAUSES
2.1. Statistics
The collection and analysis of data is a complex exercise due to the fact that the Court
has undergone changes in both its case handling and its working methods through
the years. Also, special circumstances can alter the figures quite considerably, for
example high numbers of applications with respect to systemic issues. Cases pending
at pre-trial stage (that have not yet been filtered for allocation to a judicial formation
or struck out), are not considered in the account of the pending cases and of the
backlog. Additionally, cases which are not allocated to a judicial formation do not
constitute a burden for the judges, but only for the Registry. These considerations
explain why it is easier and perhaps more correct to evaluate the workload data from
the perspective of the number of cases allocated rather than the number of those
lodged. Moreover, since the beginning of this century, use began to be made of the
joint ruling on admissibility and merits, which increased steadily until the entry into
force of Protocol n° 14, which made it the general rule.12 Since 2001, the Court has
published an Annual Report, and, since 2006, a document entitled “Analysis of the
Court Statistics”, which are both available on the Court’s website. In general, most
unfortunately, the statistical apparatus remains nonetheless partly limited. All
elements cannot be compared, especially in a long term perspective, and this makes
a complete analysis singularly difficult.
However, it can be observed that the number of applications lodged per year has
increased quite steadily at least since 1998,13 when the new system of the reformed
Court was set up as a result of the entry into force of Protocol n° 11 to the Conven-
tion. Since 2010, the number of applications has become stabilised.14
As explained above, more precise information is available on the number of applica-
tions allocated to a judicial formation per year which will be handled by a judgment
or a decision (see chart “Number of applications allocated to a judicial formation”).
These applications have been increasing gradually. These applications allocated to a
judicial formation became more stable starting from 2011, in tandem with a levelling
off in the number of applications lodged. Starting from 2014 applications allocated
12 This information has been collected also thanks to an informal discussion with a member of the Case
management and of the Case management and Working Methods Division of the Court Registry.
13 The annual reports tables presented above show that the number of lodged applications was 18.200 in
1998; 22.600 in 1999; 30.200 in 2000; 31.300 in 2001, 34.600 in 2002; 38.900 in 2003 and 44.000 in 2004.
We have not found precise data concerning the subsequent years but the Interlaken Process and the Court
Reports (European Court of Human Rights, 28 August 2013 and 12 October 2015) affirm that the increase
was about 10 to 15% every year; only in 2015 did the number decrease by around 35%, possibly because of
the application of the new Rule 47.
14 Interlaken Process and the Court, European Court of Human Rights, 28 August 2013.12
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)to a judicial formation started for the first time to decrease in number, and the trend
increased in 2015.
Applications that are not allocated to a judicial formation are disposed of adminis-
tratively. From 2005 to 2011, they have been between 11500 and almost 14000.
They increased a lot between 2013 and 2015 (by 84% in 2014 and 29% in 2015).
Many of these were disposed of by application of the new Rule of Court 47, which
introduced stricter requirements for the applications (see infra).15
From 2000 the number of applications pending before a judicial formation (i.e.
allocated but not yet decided) increased steadily, with a substantial rise from 2007
to 2011, thereafter falling substantially (see chart “Application pending before a
judicial formation”). At the end of 2014, there were fewer than 70.000 such cases,
30% less as compared with the previous year. In 2015 the level of reduction shrank
considerably to 7% as compared with 2014, due to the fact that the backlog of single
judge cases had been virtually disposed of.
Chart 1. Applications allocated to a judicial formation per year
Source: ECHR Analysis of the statistics 2015
15 Press conference, President Dean Spielmann, Strasbourg 29 January 2015, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150129_Press_Conference_2015_FRA.pdf; Analysis of Statistics
2014, Council of Europe, January 2015 and Analysis of Statistics 2015, January 2016.13
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)It is interesting to observe the evolution of the figures in the latest years, namely
after June 2010, when Protocol n° 14 entered into force. The number of applications
allocated to a judicial formation has increased only slightly (between +1 and +5%) in
the last four years. It dropped by 28% from 2014 to 2015. The relative stabilisation
and even decrease in the number of applications allocated to a judicial formation in
the last years might indicate a growing realisation on the population subject to the
Convention system that the Court is not a “final court of appeal” before which
individuals can ventilate their disappointment at national decisions.16 The entry into
force of the new rule 47 in 2014 has also had a substantial impact (see infra).
It is remarkable is that, from 2010 to 2012, the percentage ratio of applications
decided judicially (by judgment or by decision) almost doubled year on year, reaching
an outstanding increase of 68% in 2012 as compared to the previous year. It is also
interesting to note that in 2011 there was a decrease of 42% in the number of
judgments delivered. According to the Analysis of the Statistics of that year,17 this
was mainly due to the fact that fewer applications representing repetitive cases)
were processed. This demonstrates the impact that a priority policy is capable of
having in the handling of the caseload ‘(see infra).
2012 was an exemplary year for the Court’s statistical output: the number of 87,879
cases disposed of judicially (by decision or by judgement) exceeded those allocated
Chart 2. Applications pending before a judicial formation
Source: ECtHR Analysis of the statistics 2015
16 See N. Hervieu, Embellie strasbourgeoise sur le front européen des droits de l’homme in Lettre «Actualités
Droits-Libertés» du CREDOF, 30 January 2013, available at: http://revdh.org/2013/01/30/cedh-embellie-
strasbourgeoise-front-europeen-droits-homme/.
17 Analysis of Statistics 2011, European Court of Human Rights, January 2011, available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2011_ENG.pdf.14
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)by approximately 22,700. As a result, for the first time since 1998, the stock of
allocated applications pending decreased by 16% (from 151,600 to 128,100) after it
had reached an all time record of more than 160,200 in the course of 2011. The
number of applications disposed of administratively in 2012 was 18,700, 39% more
than the previous year. Administrative disposal of applications has increased
annually since 2009.
As the Court’s president pointed out during his speech of the opening of the judicial
year 2013,18 the achievements of 2012 were mainly due to recourse to practical
solutions aimed at modernising and rationalising working methods. In particular, the
single judge procedure was used to the full and the pilot judgement procedure had
been used more intensively than ever.
In 2013, for the first time, the number of pending applications was lower than 100,
000 (the figure at 31 March 2014 was 96, 05019). The number of applications
disposed of judicially amounted to 93, 396, whereby the Court achieved a reduction
of the stock of pending applications by 22%. Although the ratio of applications
considered as “backlog” within the number of the cases pending is unknown, it is a
remarkable fact that the Court was able to dispose of almost one quarter of its stock
in one year. This is especially true when compared to the 2011 estimate of the
Steering Committee for Human Rights that it would take almost 20 years for the
Court to dispose of all the applications then pending before its Chambers and
Committees and just under two and-a-half years to dispose of those pending before
single judges.20
The positive trend in the decrease of pending applications led to a number of 69,900
in 2014. So it had been more than halved in three years. It reached 64,850 by the end
of 2015.21 In 2015, the backlog of single judge formation cases has been disposed of.
At the end, there were only 3.250 such cases pending.22 Repetitive cases are the next
18 Available in the 2013 annual report: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2013_prov_
ENG.pdf.
19 European Court of Human Rights, Statistics 1/1-31/3/2014, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Stats_month_2014_ENG.pdf.
20 CDDH Interim Activity Report, Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), CDDH(2011)R72 Addendum I,
Strasbourg 1 April 2011, Council of Europe, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/
Interim_Activity_Reports/CDDH_2011_R72%20Add%20%20I%20-%20CDDH%20Interim%20Activity%20Re-
port%20_ECHR%20amendment%20measures.pdf.
CDDH is the acronym from the Steering Committee’s French name. The Council of Europe instituted a
Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), composed of representatives of the forty-seven Member
states of the Council of Europe. It defines policy and co-operation with regard to human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. The CDDH assumes in particular tasks which aim to develop and promote human rights,
as well as to improve procedures for their protection at both national and European levels, constantly
bearing in mind the evolution of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The CDDH holds
plenary meetings as well as meetings in the framework of more specialised and smaller sub-committees,
which it supervises and whose work it directs. It is assisted by a Bureau (CDDH-BU) and by a Secretariat.
21 ECHR Analysis of Statistics 2015, January 2016, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_
analysis_2015_ENG.pdf.
22 See Speech of President Raimondi, Press conference, 28 January 2016, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf.15
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)challenge ahead. In 2016, the Court was confronted with 30,500 such cases.23 Five
State Parties alone account for 67% of the total pending applications. These are, in
order of volume of applications, Ukraine, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Italy and
Hungary.24
2.2. The causes of the backlog’s growth
The European Convention on Human Rights25 was ratified on 4 November 1950 and
entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention system had a very slow
beginning, as many States took their time to ratify the Treaty. At the beginning, a
two-tier structure was in place, encompassing the Commission on Human Rights, a
non-judicial organ with a filtering function, and the Court, sitting a few days per
month. Initially very few applications were filled, it is odd nowadays to recall that in
1958 there were only 96 of them.
The Commission considered virtually all of the applications inadmissible, mostly on
the ground of “manifest inadmissibility” and was somewhat perceived as the
defender of national interests. It is therefore no surprise that the Court, which was
to be established after eight States had recognised its jurisdiction, delivered its first
judgment (Lawless v. Ireland, application n° 332/57) in 1960 (admissibility) and 1961
(merits). Barely a handful of judgments had been delivered by the end of the
nineteen-sixties. It has to be kept in mind that only in 1989/1990 did all the – at the
time 25 – State Parties accept to be respondents in cases initiated through individual
applications. This was originally subject to the condition that the State made a special
declaration. This condition was only abolished in 1997 with the entry into force of
Protocol n° 11.
The trend began to change in the 1970s, when the Commission started to modify its
approach by sending more applications to the Court, which led to an increase in the
number of judgments. In 1997, the last year before the entry into force of Protocol
n° 11, which abolished the Commission and established a single, permanent Court
(see infra), the Commission received 14,160 applications of which it sent 700 to the
Court, which in turn delivered 106 judgments.26
Before the entry into force of Protocol n° 11, the ECHR system became particularly
overloaded, for various reasons.
23 Ibidem.
24 ECHR Analysis of Statistics 2015, January 2016, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_
analysis_2015_ENG.pdf.
25 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the text of the Convention is
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
26 The reference for this historical overview is: C. Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Over-
whelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, in The European Court of Human Rights Over-
whelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, Max-Planck Institut für ausländisches
öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, R. Wolfrum and U. Deutsch eds., 2009.16
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)First, the accession of many Central and Eastern European states made a big differ-
ence. The number of potential applicants spiked up. Additionally, new-born
democratic governments, which still had a long way to go in terms of respect of the
rights covered by the Convention, were about to be arraigned as respondents before
the Court. To date, since the entry into force of the Convention in Montenegro,
presently the last of the 47 State Parties to the Council of Europe, the Convention
covers more or less 800 million people.27 Second, the novelties introduced by
Protocol n° 11 confronted the Court with new tasks, in particular filtering, decisions
on admissibility and conducting friendly settlements. Third, for various reasons,
including the extension of the right of individual petition, recourse to the ECtHR
became increasingly frequent in the original Contracting States. 28
Notwithstanding this challenge, the reformed Court showed it was capable of good
productivity, for example in 2001 it handed down 889 judgments, which was already
an improved performance. However, it was incapable of outperforming the number
of incoming applications, which, as explained above, were increasing at a pace of 10-
15% year on year up until 201329. For example, in 2006, the Court had two and a half
years of backlog to tackle.30 In 2007 it took an average of 30 months before the first
examination of an application was conducted (it was around 37 months in 201131).
2.2.1. The 2004 Explanatory Report
The Explanatory Report to Protocol n° 14 to the Convention, of 2004,32 acknowl-
edged that it had been generally recognised that the Court’s excessive caseload
(during 2003, some 39 000 new applications had been lodged and, at the end of that
year, approximately 65 000 applications were pending before it) faced two particular
challenges. The first was that of inadmissibility, since it was necessary to process the
very numerous individual applications that were terminated without a ruling on the
27 These numbers let judge P. Mahoney, in 2013, to make the pessimistic statement that it would be incon-
ceivable that the Court, although undoubtedly having the substantive jurisdiction, should have the material
capacity to look fully into the merits of all unresolved human rights violations within a convention commu-
nity of 47 states and 800 million people, in P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-
growing Caseload: Preserving the Mission of the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition
System, in The European Court Of Human Rights And Its Discontents, Turning Criticism into Strength, S.
Flogaitis, T. Zwart and J. Fraser eds., Elgar, 2013, p. 22.
28 Ibidem.
29 Interlaken Process and the Court, 2013 Report, European Court of Human Rights, 28 August 2013, available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2013_Interlaken_Process_ENG.pdf.
30 C. Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, in The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, cit.; p. 12
31 L. Wildhaber, Criticism and case-overload: Comments on the future of the European Court of Human Rights,
in The European Court Of Human Rights And Its Discontents, Turning Criticism into Strength, S. Flogaitis, T.
Zwart and J. Fraser eds., Elgar, 2013, p. 14.
32 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm17
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)merits, principally because they were declared inadmissible (more than 90% of all
applications). The second was that of repetitive applications, i.e. individual applica-
tions deriving from a similar problem of a structural character in a given Member
State. (repetitive cases are handled a so-called “pilot judgment”, see infra). Repeti-
tive applications represent approximately 50% of the Court’s caseload in 2014.33
Structural problems arose from an increased awareness of the ECHR’s potential in
the new State Parties. They also found their origin in the poor implementation of
Convention obligations and /or the faulty execution of the Court judgments. This was
aggravated by the Committee of Ministers’ weak capacity to fully comply with its task
of supervising the execution of Court judgments.34
The 2004 report forecast showed that the Court’s caseload would continue to rise
sharply if no action was taken. Moreover, the estimates of the increase were quite
conservative. Indeed, the cumulative effects of greater awareness of the Conven-
tion, in particular in the new State Parties, the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, the
ratification of other additional protocols by States which were not party to them, the
Court’s evolving and extensive interpretation of rights guaranteed by the Convention
and the prospect of the European Union’s accession to the Convention, suggested
that the annual number of applications to the Court could far exceed the figure for
2003. 35
Such an increase in the caseload would have an impact both on the Registry and on
the work of the Judges and would lead to a rapid accumulation of pending cases
before three-judges Committees and Chambers. In fact, as was the case with
Committees, the output of Chambers was far from being sufficient to keep pace with
the influx of cases brought before them. Moreover the considerable amount of time
spent on filtering work could have a negative effect on the capacity of judges and the
registry to process Chamber cases.36
2.2.2. The 2005 Lord Woolf’s report
In 2005, Lord Woolf observed, in his report for the Council of Europe on the working
methods of the Court,37 that the Court had 82,100 applications pending on 1st
33 Rapport d´Information, fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage
universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale (1) sur la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme,
par MM. Jean-Pierre MICHEL et Patrice GÉLARD, Sénateurs, n°275, enregistré à la Présidence du Sénat
français le 25 juillet 2012
34 D. Haider, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 5-6.
35 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,, cit.
36 Ibidem.
37 At that time Lord Harry Woolf was Master of the Rolls of England and Wales. He operated a review of the
Working Methods of the Court, upon the invitation of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe and
the President of the European Court of Human Rights: Review of the Working Methods of the Court, Report
by the Right Honorable The Lord Woolf, December 2005.18
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)October 2005. This was projected to grow at around 20% per year, leading to more
than a quarter of a million cases by 2010. Of the 82,100 pending cases, it was
estimated that the “core backlog”, that is to say cases that had exceeded the one-
year time limit allowed for each stage of processing an application, comprised of
27,200 cases (see Chart 4, ‘Pending applications’).38 For Lord Woolf, the backlog was
not fully representative of the general caseload of the Court (whereby 95% of appli-
cations filed were eventually declared inadmissible). The Court’s drive to increase
efficiency and to maximise its disposal rate had led to a focus on processing the more
straightforward work. He pointed out that, faced with targets, the Court lawyers
might be tempted to take on Committee cases, rather than the more complex
Chamber cases. It was estimated that up to 40% of the cases in the backlog were
Chamber, rather than Committee cases. Many of the outstanding Chamber cases
raised serious human rights questions.
During the same period, some Internal and External Audit reports had made an
estimation of personnel need. It was estimated that 620 extra staff would be needed
to cope with the backlog, and there had been much discussion around the creation
of a ‘backlog secretariat’.39
2.2.3. The 2012 Interlaken report
In 2012, the Court produced the report entitled “Interlaken Process and the Court”.
Interestingly, it made things more complex by explaining40 that the term “backlog”
had been defined differently over the years. In particular, the objectives set out in
the Brighton Declaration (see below) provided a basis for a new definition of the
term. The new definition (“Brighton backlog”) comprises applications that have not
been dealt with for the first time within a year of filing.
In fact, since repetitive applications are responsible of around 50% of the backlog of
the Court, and an unsurprisingly similar figure of 50% of the applications are
addressed against 5 or 6 State Parties, it could be inferred that its causes are not
mainly internal to the Court, but rather lie on States which do not prevent violations
and not take measures to put an end to them.41 Although it is evident that any discus-
sion or action on the future of the Court should tackle this (very sensitive) issue, the
optimal implementation of the Convention will not happen in the short or medium
run. In any case, the Court is compelled to find the most effective internal solutions
to deal with its workload.42 For the report, there had been an inherent mismatch
38 Review of the Working Methods of the Court, Report by the Right Honorable The Lord Woolf, cit.
39 Ibidem
40 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Interlaken_Process_ENG.pdf
41 See J-P. Costa, Les reformes de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – Abrighton, in L’Observateur de
Bruxelles, 2012, n. 89, p. 30-31.
42 P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload: Preserving the Mission of
the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit., p. 21.19
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)between the work of adjudication to be carried out and the capacity of the Court to
handle it.43
Aside from inadmissible and the repetitive applications, another big problem
remains to be tackled by the Court. This consists of applications which are “merito-
rious” (that is to say not manifestly inadmissible) but not considered as a priority.
While the single judge procedure aims at the disposal of inadmissible cases, and the
priority policy aims at focusing on the most prioritary cases, there is a real risk that
this last category of applications will not be handled within a reasonable period of
time. In 2013, meritorious non-priority applications were estimated to amount to
20,000 out of the 54,000 non-priority pending cases.44 At the beginning of 2016, as
President Raimondi has explained, along with priority cases, this type of application
will amount to 19,600 applications. This could be an important challenge for the
Court in the future.45
Another challenge is the generally weak understanding of the limits of the ECtHR’s
role. If 90% of applications are declared inadmissible, this means that there is a clear
gap between the expectations of those who apply to the Court and what it is
intended to do.46 It has been argued that ultimately the victims of the success of the
Court are not the Court itself, but the applicants who have filed meritorious applica-
tions and have to wait long time for their cases to be ruled.47 This is partly due to the
fact that applications to the Court are free of charge and that there is no need to be
assisted by a lawyer. Applicants have thus literally nothing to lose in filing a case.
One of the main problems remains knowledge and education throughout Europe
regarding the Convention system. Better information and dissemination on the
conditions of admissibility of a case and of the case-law of the Court is crucial in
restraining an increase in the volume of (unmeritorious) applications. This has to be
done by addressing both the general public, those following a legal education and
legal professionals.48
In that context, one of the main obstacles to the dissemination of the “acquis de
Strasbourg” is the fact that judgments and decisions are only delivered in English and
French, languages that cannot be presumed to be known – and the legal jargon
43 Ibidem.
44 See P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload: Preserving the
Mission of the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit. p.24-25; see also L.
Wildhaber, Criticism and case-overload: Comments on the future of the European Court of Human Rights
cit. p. 15-16.
45 Press conference, President Guido Raimondi, 28 January 2016, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Speech_20160128_Raimondi_JY_PC_ENG.pdf.
46 J. Fraser, Conclusion: The European Convention on Human Rights as a common European endeavor, in
Conclusion: The European Convention on Human Rights as a common European endeavor, in The European
Court Of Human Rights And Its Discontents, Turning Criticism into Strength, S. Flogaitis, T. Zwart and J.
Fraser eds., Elgar, 2013, p. 196.
47 See J-P. Costa, Les reformes de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, cit., p. 30-31.
48 J. Fraser, Conclusion: The European Convention on Human Rights as a common European endeavor, in
Conclusion: The European Convention on Human Rights as a common European endeavor, cit., p. 207-209.20
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)understood – by the citizens and legal practitioners in the 47 States.49 The Court has
lately been quite active in this regard, by drafting and translating a series of informa-
tion documents, namely a “Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria” into all the
languages,50 and publishing a series of case-law “factsheets”, guidelines and summa-
ries on a series of issues.51 The Court has launched a Russian version of its ‘Hudoc’
research engine (to be added to the French, English and Turkish ones), plans to make
it available in Bulgarian and Spanish in 2016 and is engaged in a project that aims at
translating key case-law into a series of target languages, financially supported by a
number of actors, namely the Human Rights Trust Fund (HRTF).52 The HRTF is due to
come to an end in 2016, therefore the Court called State Parties to promote the
translation of decisions, in line with the Brussels’s declaration call for accessibility.53
The old saying that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’ is equally applicable to the
Court, which cannot afford not to respect its own standards.54 The lack of efficiency
and excessive length in dealing with applications might also lead to possible human
rights victims being discouraged from applying, which would leave violations unpun-
ished55 and jeopardise the reputation and therefore the authority, of the Court’s
judgments. The Court is thus obliged to solutions enabling it to deal with its task of
guardian of the Convention in an efficient and high quality manner.
Another issue which should not be neglected, as it plays a fairly big role in the
workload of the Court, is that of interim measures. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court56
provides that the Court may, at the request of a party or of any other person
concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties an interim measure which it
considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct
of the proceedings. The competence to indicate an interim measure lies on
49 C. Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, in The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, cit.
50 Available on the website of the Court: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/analysis&c=
#n1347458601286_pointer.
51 Available on the website of the Court: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=caselaw/analysis&c=
#n1347891100085_pointer.
52 See Case-law information, training and outreach, in Annual Report 2014, ECHR, January 2015.
53 See Case-law information, training and outreach, in Annual Report 2015, ECHR January 2016.
54 See Case-law information, training and outreach, in Annual Report 2014, ECHR, January 2015.
55 See the Speech given by Mr Dean Spielmannn, President of the European Court of Human Rights, on the
occasion of the opening of the judicial year, 25 January 2013, cit.
56 Rule 39 (available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf)
1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to
paragraph 4 of this Rule may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of their own
motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which they consider should be adopted in the interests
of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings.
2. Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be
given to the Committee of Ministers.
3. The Chamber or, where appropriate, the President of the Section or a duty judge appointed pursuant to
paragraph 4 of this Rule may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the imple-
mentation of any interim measure indicated.
4. The President of the Court may appoint Vice-Presidents of Sections as duty judges to decide on requests
for interim measures.21
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)Chambers or on Presidents of Section. Since the last amendment of Rule 39, in 2013,
it also lies on Vice-Presidents of Sections appointed as duty judges by the President
of the Court.
Interim measures are urgent measures which apply in case of imminent risk of irrep-
arable harm. They are decided in connection with proceedings before the Court
without prejudging any subsequent decisions on the admissibility or merits of the
case in question. They mostly relate to the rights covered by articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention in the framework of expulsions or extraditions, although their use is no
longer limited to these two articles.57 The Court’s practice is to examine each request
on an individual and priority basis through a written procedure. Refusals to grant
interim measures cannot be appealed and such measures can be discontinued at any
time. An interim measure is usually ordered for the duration of the main proceedings
or a shorter period.
Although they are only provided for in the Rules of Court and not in the Convention,
the Grand Chamber has clarified that States are under an obligation to comply with
them.58
The table above represents the trend in the filing and granting of request for interim
measures by the Court in the latest years. There was a steady increase with a peak in
2010 and then a decrease until 2013. The increase in 2014 is due to the requests
57 For an overview of the case-law until 2010, C. Harby, The Changing Nature of Interim Measures before the
European Court of Human Rights E.H.R.L.R., 2010, 1, p. 73-84.
Chart 3.
Table elaborated with the data published in the Court’s Annual Reports and Analysis of Statistics.
58 For more information, see Factsheet – Interim measures, European Court of Human Rights, January 2013,
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Interim_measures_ENG.pdf.
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THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)linked to the situation in Ukraine, which has the largest number of such applica-
tions.59
Recently, requests for interim measures have been filed by migrants of various
nationalities refusing to be returned to Hungary. Although so far the number of
requests related to the migrant crisis has not been very substantial, the Court has
developed an action plan to be able to react in case of a large influx of requests of
this type.60
As clearly stated in the Court’s Annual Report of the ‘peak year’ 2010, requests for
interim measures represent an additional burden for the Court and its Registry.61 In
2011, as President Bratza stated in the Annual Report, having been nearly
submerged by interim measures just over a year before, the Court changed its proce-
dures at the judicial and administrative level, revised its practice direction, and,
through its President, made a public statement on the situation. These measures
have produced effects quickly, returning this aspect of proceedings to a more normal
rhythm.62 Some State Parties have requested (sometimes for political reasons) to
introduce a statement of reasons for the decisions concerning the interim measures.
Though the Court is not enthusiastic (for valid reasons, since this is an interlocutery
measure), it has indicated during the 2015 Brussels conference that it would study
this topic.63
To recapitulate, there are a lot of explanations for the ECtHR’s backlog. In fact, the
whole ECHR system changed fundamentally after 1989. There are now more State
Parties, with a greater variety of human rights issues. The regime of individual appli-
cations has been strengthened. The implementation of rights and the enforcement
of judgments in the Council of Europe framework remain weak. Many applications
are inadmissible, often a consequence of a weak knowledge of the limits of the ECHR.
Many cases are repetitive. A lot of interim measures are sought.
59 Analysis of the Statistics 2016, ECHR January 2016.
60 See Speech of President Raimondi, Press conference, 28 January 2016, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf.
61 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2010, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Annual_report_2010_ENG.pdf,  p. 15.
62 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2011, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Annual_report_2012_ENG.pdf,  p. 33.
63 Annual Report 2015.23
3. INTERNATIONAL DEBATES OVER THE REFORM
A fascinating aspect of the reform process in the Council of Europe has been its open
and strongly debated nature. It was also a widely consensual one. There lies a funda-
mental difference with the EU Courts’ reform in the European Union, which was
generally closed, opaque, very weakly debated, and often conflictual.
The need for an in-depth first reflection as to how to ensure effectiveness in spite of
an increasing number of applications has been the object of discussion since the
beginning of this century. Possible options were already discussed at an embryonic
level at the European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, held in Rome on the
occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Convention, in 2000.64 By a decision of the
Committee of Ministers of February 2001, an evaluation group in charge of analysing
possible means to improve the Court’s efficiency was established.65 The Group
released a first report in September 2001, tackling the issue of case overload that it
was feared put at serious risk the efficacy of the Convention system and proposing a
range of measures.66 In 2003, the Court reacted to a Report67 of the Human Rights
Steering Committee68 by a memorandum adopted unanimously by the plenary
session on 12 September 2003, in which it warned that any reform would have to
introduce flexibility in the procedural framework and have a prospective approach,
in order to be at the same time firm and capable of adapting to unexpected changes,
including outstanding fluctuations of the caseload.69
3.1. The first reports (2005 and 2006)
The Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the President of Court appointed
the abovementioned Lord Harry Woolf, to carry out a Review of the Working
Methods of the Court. The purpose was to suggest administrative steps that could
be taken, without amending the Convention, to allow the Court to cope with its
current and projected caseload, pending more fundamental reform. The review was
published in December 2005.70
64 Proceedings available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Proceedings/Rome_en.pdf.
65 Composed of President Wildhaber, Deputy Secretary General Kruger an Lord Woolf as Chairman
66 Report available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Proceedings/Rome_en.pdf.
67 Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Interim_Activity_Reports/2003_PR_fr.pdf.
68 The CDDH, already mentioned, has been working on the reform of the Convention system since 1999,
before the Rome Conference of 2000. It gave its contribution in the reform package that included Protocol
14, was involved in the follow-up to the Report of the Group of Wise Persons and in the preparation and
follow up of the reform process started at Interlaken. More information available in the dedicated section
of the website of the Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/default_en.asp.
69 Quoted by F. Tulkens, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la
réforme et penser à l’avenir, in Cahiers de droit européen, 2012, n° 2, p. 210.
70 Working Methods of the Court, Report by the Right Honorable The Lord Woolf, December 2005, available
at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2005_Lord_Woolf_working_methods_ENG.pdf.24
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cation by accepting properly completed comprehensive application forms. It
suggested establishing satellite offices of the Registry in key states that produce high
numbers of inadmissible applications. These offices would provide applicants with
information as to the Court’s admissibility criteria, and the availability, locally, of
ombudsmen and other alternative methods of resolving disputes. In general,
methods of alternative resolution should be encouraged, and a “friendly settlement
unit” created within the Court’s Registry. The report advocated a greater use of the
Pilot Judgment procedure (see infra), as it allows repetitive cases to be dealt with
summarily. The review also suggested that the Court establish a just satisfaction unit
to give guidance as to rates of compensation. Where possible, issues of compensa-
tion could be remitted to domestic courts for resolution. In addition, Lord Woolf
recommended appointment of a second Deputy Registrar, responsible for manage-
ment of the Court’s lawyers and staff, and the creation of a Central Training Unit for
lawyers.
In 2006, a report from a “Group of Wise Men” was presented to the Committee of
Ministers.71 The Group of Wise Men had been appointed in parallel with the
adoption of Protocol 14 (before Lord Woolf’s appointment to review working
methods) by the governments, in order to elaborate a long term strategy for the
Convention system. It addressed, inter alia, the “explosion” in the number of
individual applications to the Court. It affirmed that it was essential to recommend
effective measures to remedy this situation on a permanent basis, to make it possible
to ensure the long-term effectiveness of the Convention’s control mechanism
without limiting the right of individual application, thus allowing the Court to concen-
trate on its function as the custodian of human rights.
The proposals included greater flexibility of the procedure for reforming the judicial
machinery, the establishment of a new judicial filtering mechanism, enhanced
cooperation with national courts through the possibility of delivering advisory
opinions, the improvement of domestic remedies for redressing violations of the
Convention, relieving the Court from the task of awarding just satisfaction and
encouraging use of procedural tools to enhance efficiency such as the pilot proce-
dure.
It is not, however, until 2010 that a series of high level conference meetings were
held in order to tackle the various issues linked to the reform of the Court.
71 Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, CM(2006)203 15 November 2006,
available at CM(2006)203 15 November 2006.25
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)3.2. Interlaken
The conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights was held at
Interlaken on 18-19 February 2010. The Interlaken Declaration72 was issued at a time
when criticism started to be voiced, even against the very existence of the Court.73
The Declaration contains an action plan ‘as an instrument to provide political
guidance for the process towards long-term effectiveness of the Convention system’.
The Preamble reaffirmed the attachment to the right of individual petition, called for
a strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity and for a uniform and rigorous appli-
cation of the criteria concerning admissibility and the Court’s jurisdiction. It invited
the Court to make maximum use of the procedural tools and resources at its disposal.
It stressed the need for the reduction of clearly inadmissible applications, for effec-
tive filtering, and for finding solutions for dealing with repetitive applications. In
addition, it pointed out the need to simplify the procedure for amending Convention
provisions of an organizational nature, entertaining the idea of a Statute of the Court.
The Conference stressed the need for a thorough analysis of the Court’s practice
relating to applications it declared inadmissible and recommended setting up a
mechanism within the existing bench in order to ensure effective filtering. It
suggested that the Committee of Ministers examine setting up of a filtering mecha-
nism within the Court, going beyond the single judge procedure.
It called upon States Parties to facilitate the adoption of friendly settlements and
unilateral declarations and to cooperate with the Committee of Ministers in order to
adopt and implement general measures capable of remedying effectively the struc-
tural problems at the origin of repetitive cases. As far as the pilot judgment proce-
dure is concerned (see infra), the Conference stressed the need for the Court to
develop clear and predictable standards for such procedure as regards the selection
of applications, the procedure to be followed and the treatment of adjourned cases,
and to evaluate the application of these kinds of procedures. In addition, it called
upon the Committee of Ministers to consider whether repetitive cases could be
handled by judges responsible for filtering. Furthermore, the action plan set specific
deadlines. These included an invitation to the Committee of Ministers to follow up
and implement, by June 2011 and in cooperation with the appropriate bodies, those
measures which did not require an amendment of the Convention.
72 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19,
February 2010, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_
ENG.pdf
73 See F. Tulkens, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la reforme
et penser à l’avenir, cit., p. 318;26
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The second high level conference was held during the Turkish Chairmanship of the
Committee of Ministers at Izmir on 26-27 April 2011. It welcomed the measures
taken by the Court including the adoption of a priority policy and the new rule on the
pilot procedure. At the same time, it expressed concern at the continued rise in the
Court’s workload and cast doubt over the effectiveness of Protocol 14 in that
context.
The Declaration included a follow-up plan. As well as repeating many of the points
raised at Interlaken, new proposals were tabled. Future chairmanships were invited
to follow up this Declaration jointly with that of Interlaken. States were invited to
give priority to the resolution of repetitive cases by way of friendly settlements or
unilateral declarations where appropriate.
The Conference considered that the Court, when referring to its “well-established
case-law” in the framework of repetitive cases, should take account of legislative and
factual circumstances and developments in the respondent States.
The Court was further invited to apply fully, consistently and foreseeably all admissi-
bility criteria and the rules regarding the scope of its jurisdiction, rationes temporis,
loci, personae and materiae and to give full effect to the new admissibility criterion
of “significant disadvantage”. It was also pointed out that the case law should
reaffirm that the ECtHR was not a fourth-instance court, thereby avoiding the re-
examination of issues of fact and law decided by national courts.
The Conference welcomed the production of information material and further
encouraged States Parties to second national judges and, where appropriate, other
high-level independent lawyers, to the Court Registry.
3.4. Brighton
2011 saw the beginning of the UK’s six-month chairmanship. In the preceding years,
members of its coalition government had expressed concerns over the role of the
ECtHR, notably regarding some politically controversial judgments. The UK had
argued that rather than focusing on such “domestic” issues the Court system should
concentrate on serious human-rights abuses and on ensuring that these judgments
are effectively enforced, stressing on the subsidiary role of the ECtHR system and
proposing stricter admissibility criteria.74 The Declaration resulting from the Brighton
Conference of 19 and 20 April 2012 is however less radical.75 After pointing out that
the principles of subsidiarity and of the margin of appreciation should be given
74 Reforming the European Court of Human Rights, cit.
75 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 19-20
April 2012, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf.27
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)prominence and be consistently applied, the Conference concluded that they should
only be given a reference in the Preamble of the Convention.
The Conference paid a lot of attention to the provisions of Article 35 of the Conven-
tion encouraging the Court to have regard to the need to take a strict and consistent
approach towards the admissibility of applications, clarifying its case law to this
effect as necessary. It welcomed the Court’s suggestion that the time limit under
Article 35(1) of the Convention within which an application must be made to the
Court should be shortened to four months. It concluded that the provision of the
Convention applying the criterion of significant disadvantage, Article 35(3)(b), should
be severed from the requirement that no case should be rejected on the ground of
the lack of significant disadvantage where it had not been duly considered by a
domestic tribunal. The conference also suggested that an application should be
regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35(3)(a), inter alia,
when the Court considers that the application raises a complaint that has already
been duly considered by a domestic court which has applied the rights guaranteed
by the Convention in light of the Court’s well-established case law, including the
margin of appreciation, unless the Court finds that the application raises a serious
question affecting the interpretation or the application of the Convention. Most of
these suggestions were included in Protocol n° 15 to the Convention.
In addition, it invited the Court to develop its case law on the exhaustion of domestic
remedies so as to require an applicant, where a domestic remedy was available, to
argue before the national court or tribunal the alleged violation of the Convention
rights or an equivalent provision of domestic law, thereby allowing national courts
an opportunity to apply the Convention in light of the Court’s case law.
Concerning the processing of applications, the Conference welcomed the advances
already made by the Court. It noted with appreciation the Court’s assessment that it
could dispose of pending clearly inadmissible applications by 2015. It acknowledged
the Court’s request for the further secondment of national judges and high-level
independent lawyers to its Registry to allow it to achieve this.
The Declaration invited the Committee of Ministers, building on the pilot judgment
procedure, to consider the advisability and modalities of a procedure by which the
Court could register and determine a small number of representative applications
from a group of applications alleging the same violation against the same respondent
State Party, such determination being applicable to the whole group.
In addition, it noted that, in order to enable the Court to decide the applications
pending before its Chambers in a reasonable time, it might be necessary in the future
to appoint additional judges to the Court. This was the first time that this possibility
was mentioned in any official conclusions. It needs to be emphasized that it has not
been extensively studied during the next years.28
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)The Conference further suggested measures to facilitate the filing of applications, by
means of on-line tools and improved forms to be filled in by the applicants. Finally, it
invited the Court to take into consideration the application of a broader interpreta-
tion of the concept of well-established case law within the meaning of Article 28(1)
of the Convention, the provision defining the jurisdiction of the three-judge Commit-
tees, in order to enlarge its scope without prejudice to the appropriate examination
of the individual circumstances of the case.
The Declaration pointed out the Court’s aspiration of being able to decide whether
to communicate a case within one year, and thereafter to make all communicated
cases the subject of a decision or judgment within two years of communication.
However, it acknowledged that, for these measures to be effective and for their
objectives to be attained, the Court required adequate resources.
3.5. Oslo
On 5-7 April 2014, the “MultiRights Annual Conference” took place at Oslo under the
auspices of the Council of Europe, with the participation of ECtHR judges, academia,
management of the Court and experts.76 Its theme was the long-term future of the
Court.
In his speech,77 President Spielmann pointed out that 2012 and 2013 were excellent
years for the productivity of the Court. In particular, the backlog of manifestly
inadmissible cases for some formerly high count countries, such as Turkey, Romania
and Poland, had been disposed of. The progress in productivity had allowed the
volume of the pending cases to be as “low” as 96,000, but for this trend to continue
it was necessary that serious steps were taken to execute judgments, notably in
states such as Italy and Ukraine.
One of the main issues to tackle, observed the President, was that of repetitive cases.
Efforts should be made both at Court and Member State level. For its part, the Court
improved the efficiency of its filtering section, which would deal with repetitive cases
(and not only those allocated to a single judge) with the help of new ICT solutions.
The link between repetitive applications and non/bad execution of judgments should
not be neglected78. Dialogue with national courts should also be promoted,
especially in light of the subsidiary role of the Court in the enforcement of the
Convention, as emphasised by the new Protocol n° 16. He finally stressed that the
Court has a mainly constitutional role, but is also called to make justice to daily viola-
tions of human rights, for which it is respected all over the world. No official declara-
76 Information on the website: http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/news-and-events/events/2014/
coe-conference-en/conference-programme.html.
77 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140407_Spielmannn_FRA.pdf.
78 President Spielmann did not spare his criticism of the wishes of some governments to take participate in
the CCDH reflections on the procedure for the adoption of rules of court.29
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mental character; however, the proceedings have been published.79
3.6. Brussels
A high level Conference on the future of the Court took place on 26 and 27 March
2015 in Brussels under the auspices of the Belgian Chairmanship of the Council of
Europe. The theme of the Conference was “The implementation of the European
Convention of Human Rights, our shared responsibility.”
In its Contribution paper to the Conference,80 the Court pointed out that very
positive developments had lead its docket to decline, and that the issue of the effec-
tive implementation of the Convention has gained primary importance. This had to
be addressed both under the angle of the prevention of violations and the execution
of judgments. For the first angle, the Court underlined its continuous efforts to
improve information about the ECHR system. For the execution angle, the Court
pointed out that, although they decreased in number, repetitive cases still amounted
to around half of the docket. The Court mentioned the possibility of indicating in the
judgments’ reasoning the type of measures required for their implementation. It also
envisaged the possibility of expressly mentioning, when appropriate, that no specific
measure other than payment is foreseen. A further interesting measure proposed by
the Court was that of giving applicants the possibility to reopen domestic proceed-
ings after the Court had established that the original ones infringed the Convention.
Finally, the Court advocated the idea of having, in each country, a designated
authority with general responsibility for ensuring that measures for the execution of
judgements have been taken.
The “Brussels Declaration” of 27 March 201581 stated that the backlog of clearly
inadmissible cases was expected to be cleared by the end of the year. It reaffirmed
the importance for States to respect the right to individual application, including
regarding interim measures, the need to promote knowledge and compliance with
the Convention and the execution of judgements. The conference considered that
79 Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights – Proceedings, Pluri Courts
–Council of Europe 2014, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFOR-
MECHR/Publications/Proceedings-Oslo-2014.pdf.
80 Contribution of the Court to the Brussels Conference, ECHR, 26 January 2015, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2015_Brussels_Conference_Contribution_Court_ENG.pdf; see also, on the
same topic: CDDH contribution to the High-level Conference on “The implementation of the Convention,
our shared responsibility”, organised by the Belgian Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers (Brussels,
26-27 March 2015), Steering Committee for HGuman Rights, Council of Europe, 21 November 2014, avail-
able at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/CDDH-DOCUMENTS/CDDH(2014)R82-Add-II-
en.pdf. On the execution of the ECtHR, see also the excellent chronicles of E. Lambert, in Revue trimestrielle
des Droits de l’Homme.
81 High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared
responsibility” Brussels Declaration 27 March 2015, available at: http://justice.belgium.be/fr/binaries/
Declaration_EN_tcm421-265137.pdf.30
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)emphasis should be placed on solving the problems of repetitive applications and in
particular those well founded, as well on dealing with cases of serious violations of
human rights.
The Action Plan section of the Declaration contains evokes different measures. It
welcomed the Court’s (not so enthousiastic in fact) intention to provide brief reasons
for decisions on inadmissibility taken by a single judge, indicating provisional
measures and by panels of five judges adjudicating on the refusal of requests for
referral to the Grand Chamber. In addition, it supported further exploration of case-
management practices, in particular with regard to prioritization and the pilot-judge-
ment procedure. A new element was the call for greater transparency towards the
parties on the state of the proceedings. A series of recommendations are then
addressed to the State Parties for a better implementation of the Convention system
at national level, through information and training and, in particular, the execution
of judgments. In particular, the Conference called upon the parties to put in place
domestic remedies to address violations of the Convention and to deploy sufficient
resources to the execution of judgments, especially those raising structural
problems. Some recommendations were addressed to the Committee of Ministers
on the supervision of the execution of judgements.
To conclude, all the analysis, brainstorming, proposals and implementing actions
that the Court and its stakeholders have taken in the last decades have led now to
focus more issues outside the Court’s own responsibility, that is to say the implemen-
tation of Convention at national level. However, the court strives to make its contri-
bution, as it should, for example by adapting the content of its judgments, to improve
the aoperation of the Convention system.
A first follow up to the Brussels Conference was the “Interlaken Process and the
Court” document of October 2015.82 The Court should start to include a succinct
statement of the reasons in single judge decision from 2016, also thanks to the
reduction of the backlog of this type of application. In addition, a Network of Superior
Courts is currently in a test phase, with the aim to facilitate the exchange of informa-
tion concerning case-law and the application of the Convention in general.
Moreover, the Court has developed a tool to keep the Committee of Ministers
informed of the state of pending cases.
82 Interlaken Process and the Court (2015 report), ECHR, 12 October 201631
4. MEASURES TO TACKLE THE BACKLOG
It is possible now to enumerate the numerous reforms undertaken by the ECtHR that
had an impact in the handling of its backlog. They will be presented here with a
summary evaluation.
4.1. New Judicial Formations and competences
4.1.1. The measure
Protocol n° 14 introduced Single Judge Formations, with jurisdiction to declare
inadmissible, or to strike out, individual applications. As provided for by the new
Article 27 of the Convention, when they decide not to issue a final decision on admis-
sibility, Single Judges shall forward the application to a Chamber or Committee.
Single Judges are appointed for twelve months by the President of the Court and are
assisted by non-judicial Registry rapporteurs. These are part of the Registry and
function under the authority of the President83. Section Registrars and Deputy
Section Registrars shall act ex officio as non-judicial rapporteurs.
The Single Judges are appointed by the President of the Court, who also decides on
their number, after having consulted the Bureau. The President draws up a list of
States in respect of which each single judge shall examine applications throughout its
appointment in this capacity. The Single Judges continue to carry out their duties
within the Sections of which they are members84.
Furthermore, Protocol n° 14, by amending Article 28 of the Convention, empowered
the Three Judge Committees to also rule on the merits of an application where the
underlying question in the case is already the subject of well-established case-law of
the Court. They decide by unanimous vote and according to a simplified procedure;
the decisions are final. The competence of the committees has therefore been
extended to cover repetitive cases. Three Judge Committees can rule simultaneously
on admissibility and merits, which has become the norm in the Court’s practice,
however they remain free to choose on a case by case basis.
Finally, Article 26, paragraph 2, was amended to provide that, at the request of the
plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a unanimous decision and for a
fixed period, reduce from seven to five the number of judges of the Chambers. This
has not been done so far, since it could provoke new problems, for example the diffi-
83 See Rules, Art. 18A.
84 See Court Rules, Art. 27A.32
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)culty in constituting geographically balanced chambers, the need to avoid three-to-
two decisions, and possibly the appointment of supplementary judges.85
4.1.2. Results
The creation of Single Judge Formations is one of the essential positive changes
brought to the organization of the ECtHR. Single Judges have allowed a very high
number of unmeritorious applications to be disposed of. In 2010, out of 38,576
judicial decisions of inadmissibility or striking out, 22,260 were delivered by single
judge formations, which became operative in the second half of that year. In 2011
Single Judges delivered 46, 930 decisions, a figure double that of 2010, but this time
during an entire year, thus showing a certain steadiness in the level of productivity.
In 2012, the number of single judge decisions was 81,764, an increase of 74%
compared to the previous year, mainly due to the application of new working
methods and to the fact that a higher number of judges were appointed as single
judges.86 In 2013, a similar number of decisions, 80,583, were delivered by single
judge formations.87 In 2014, single judges declared inadmissible or struck out of the
list approximately 78,700 applications, leaving the relatively ‘tiny’ amount of 8,200.
Finally, as the Court had anticipated, during 2015 the backlog of single judges cases
was absorbed, the current number of pending cases at the beginning being 3,250.
Thus, the Court is now able to dispose of this type of application quite quickly. This
allows it to divert the resources devoted to solving the single judge applications crisis
to other types of needs, such as repetitive, priority cases or non-priority/non
inadmissible cases.88
The single judge mechanism retained the judicial character of the decision on admis-
sibility, while lowering the number of judges involved. This process has been defined
as part of the “judicial downsizing” effect of the Protocol 14 reforms. 36 judges are
alternately appointed as single judges, assisted by 80 Registry lawyers.89
It has been observed that Protocol 14 has basically transferred to the Single Judge
formations the former competences of the three judge Committees.90 Some
commentators have drawn a comparison with some institutions active at first
85 European law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, July 6th
2012, available at http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/S-1-
2012_Statement_on_Case_Overload_at_the_European_Court_of_Human_Rights.pdf.
86 Analysis of statistics 2013, cit.
87 European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of statistics 2012, January 2013, available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf.
88 See Speech of President Raimondi, Press conference, 28 January 2016, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf.
89 Reform of the Court: Filtering of cases successful in reducing backlog, Press release issued by Registrar of
the Court, ECHR 312 (2013) 24.10.2013.
90 L. Caflish, La nouvelle répartition des compétences au sein de al Cour: le juge unique et les comités, in The
European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, Samantha
Besson (ed.), Schulhess, 2011, pp. 47 et suiv.33
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)instance in domestic legal systems, such as the French “juge de paix”.91 An early,
rather pessimistic comment pointed out that the establishment of the new forma-
tions could lead to a “denationalisation” of the national judge.92 Others pointed out
that the Court should beware of the risk that the personal responsibility of judges
could be offset by the non-judicial rapporteurs.93 For some observers, the single
judges only seldom depart from the reports of the Registry officials. The veracity of
such comments remains difficult to assess.
By reducing the volume of the backlog as of 2016, the introduction of Single Judge
formations can be said to have been a verifiable success in terms of efficiency. In
carrying out this task, the Court will also be able to provide a statement of reasoning.
It nevertheless remains the case that, although the backlog has widely decreased
thanks to the productivity of the single judges, this does not automatically mean that
a higher number of violations of human rights have faced justice.94 This situation
could still call for a deeper reform of the system, in particular as far as the filtering
mechanism is concerned.
The three-judge Committees have not so far delivered a very high number of
judgments. This trend may change in the future. In 2010, the number of judgments
delivered by this new formation was 116 out of 1, 499 judgments in respect of 2, 607
applications, many of which had been joined. In the last few years, the number of
judgments delivered by the three-judge committees has not changed greatly,
ranging from between 209 and 269 in 2011-2014.95
Before the entry into force of Protocol n° 14, this formation was chiefly responsible
for filtering, which is now allocated to the single judge formation. One of the main
issues brought by the new formulation of article 28 of the Convention is that may risk
hindering the respect of the natural judge principle by the ECtHR. The exact meaning
of the expression “well established case law of the Court”, over which this formation
has been accorded competence, remains uncertain. Although it may seem clear that
the definition aims at repetitive cases, its scope as far as other types of applications
are concerned appears to be unclear. The small number of judgments delivered by
this formation may lead one to conclude that the expression has so far been inter-
preted quite strictly96.
91 C. Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, in The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, cit., p. 13-14.
92 F. Tulkens, La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la reforme et
penser à l’avenir, cit., p. 312.
93 C. Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible
Solutions, cit.
94 See, among others, E. Fribergh, First Experiences with Protocol No 14 and Further Need for Reform, cit., M.
O’Boyle, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights, in German Law Journal, Vol. 12, n. 10, 2011, p.
1862-.
95 Annual Analysis of Statistics.
96 See J-P. Costa, Les réformes de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, op.cit., p. 32.34
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cases more often than the Chambers, especially when dealing with repetitive appli-
cations. In 2013 for example, the 219 Committee judgments accounted for 75% of
the number of cases decided by judgement. Thus although there are often not many
judgments, they have the effect of closing a lot of cases. On the one hand the lower
number of Committee judgments may be seen as a guarantee for the applicants of
meritorious applications, who have more chances to have their case tackled by a
Chamber. On the other hand, it can be detrimental to the speed of justice and to the
productivity of the ECtHR.
The possibility for the three-judge Committees to rule jointly on admissibility and
merits on questions covered by well-established case law has been said to be, if used
to the maximum of its potential, the most useful innovation wrought by Protocol n°
14 to solve the problem of the overload of repetitive cases. A more intense use of this
formation is expected to be the most useful solution to deal with this problem.97
In fact, in recent years the Court has developed what it calls the WECL (well estab-
lished case-law procedure), supported by new IT tools. It uses methods that have
proven to be effective in filtering applications. This procedure is also meant to relieve
pressure on the Chambers so they can concentrate further on other priority cases.98
In 2015, the Court affirmed that it had the means and tools, in particular the IT tools,
to deal with repetitive cases, and that it would eliminate this part of the docket
within the next two years.99
4.2. Filtering Section
4.2.1. The measure
This is another essential positive change to the functioning of the ECtHR. At the
beginning of 2011 a new Filtering Section was appointed at the Court to carry out a
thorough and immediate sifting of all cases, to ensure that all applications are placed
on the appropriate procedural track and allocated to the appropriate judicial forma-
tion, in accordance with the Court’s priority policy. The Filtering Division of the old
ECtHR has become a Filtering Section. The Filtering Section was initially established
to centralise the handling of the incoming cases from five of the highest case-count
countries.100 It is made up of the judges appointed as Single Judge and the Registry
rapporteurs who have been appointed by the President of the Court to assist them.
97 See F. Tulkens, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la réforme
et penser à l’avenir, cit., p. 312.
98 See Response of the Court to the “CDDH report containing conclusions and possible proposals on ways to
resolve the large number of applications arising from systemic issues identified by the Court”, ECHR, 20
October 2015, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2014-ECHR_response_CDDH_report.pdf.
99 The Interlaken process and the Court (2015 report), ECtHR, 2015.
100 Reform of the Court: Filtering of cases successful in reducing backlog, Press release issued by Registrar of
the Court, ECHR 312 (2013) 24.10.2013.35
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issuing of Single Judge decisions on admissibility.
In 2014, President Spielmann indicated that the Filtering Section will also deal with
repetitive applications, according to a “one in-one out” policy.101 In 2014, in fact, the
number of applications pending at Single Judge level decreased by 69%; therefore
the objective of eradicating the backlog of such applications by the end of the year
2015 seems to be progressing well.
4.2.2. The results
The Filtering Section handled mainly cases from Russia, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine
and Poland).102. After six months, it was already clear that the creation of the
Filtering Section had led to the development and sharing of best practices which
have helped to speed up the administrative and judicial processing of incoming appli-
cations. By the end of June 2011, the Filtering Section had recorded 21,859 new
applications. During the same period, 11,369 applications against five States were
dealt with by a Single Judge, an increase of 42% compared to 2010.103
A question that may arise concerning the operation of filtering section concerns the
power given to each single judge member. They can analyse, filter and discard an
application in complete autonomy.
4.3. The new admissibility criterion
4.3.1. The measure
Protocol n° 14 to the Convention introduced a new admissibility criterion. It basically
requires proof of having suffered from a significant disadvantage as a consequence
of the alleged violation of the Convention. In other words, the Convention adopted
the “de minimis non curat praetor” principle. The objective was to enable a faster
disposal of unmeritorious cases allowing the Court to concentrate on its core
mission.104
101 Conférence de presse Président Dean Spielmann, 30 January 2014, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme,
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20140130_Spielmannn_JY_PC_FRA.pdf.
102 Filtering Section speeds up processing of cases from highest case-count countries, European Court of
Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Filtering_Section_ENG.pdf (the date of
publication is not indicated but inferable from the wording of the document).
103 Ibidem.
104 Research Report, The new admissibility criterion under Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention: case-law princi-
ples two years on, European Court of Human Rights, 2012, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Research_report_admissibility_criterion_ENG.pdf. In case Dudek v. Germany (apps no. 12977/09 et
al, decision of 23/11/10), the Court itself stated that “The High Contracting Parties clearly wished that the
Court devote more time to cases which warrant consideration on the merits, whether seen from the
perspective of the legal interest of the individual applicant or considered from the broader perspective of
the law of the Convention and the European public order to which it contributes”.36
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)According to new Article 35, paragraph 3, letter b) of the Convention, the Court shall
declare individual applications inadmissible if it considers that the applicant has not
suffered a significant disadvantage. Nonetheless, the text provides for two so-called
safeguards, the first being: ‘unless respect for human rights as defined in the Conven-
tion and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the
merits’; and the second: ‘provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which
has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.’105
The Court may raise the new admissibility criterion of its own motion or in response
to an objection raised by the responding government. So far, there are examples of
the Court having appraised the new criterion before, after, or jointly with other
admissibility requirements.
4.3.2. Results
The new text of Article 35, paragraph 3, letter b) of the Convention being quite
general, it is the responsibility of the Court to specify how it will apply these
elements. During the first year from the entry into force of the new Protocol, only 10
separate admissibility decisions applying this criterion were issued. Until the end
2015, the provision in question had been applied in approximately 40 decisions,106 a
number largely insufficient to have had a substantial impact over the total caseload
of the Court107.
The Interlaken Declaration invited the Court to give full effect to the new admissi-
bility criterion and to consider other possibilities for applying the de minimis
principle.108 The Izmir Declaration reiterated the invitation for the Court to give full
effect to the criterion ‘in accordance’ to the de minimis principle.109 The Brighton
Declaration went further, by stressing the importance of applying ‘strictly and
consistently the admissibility criteria, in order to reinforce confidence in the rigour
of the Convention system and to ensure that unnecessary pressure is not placed on
its workload.’ In addition, the Conference called for the removal of the second
safeguard clause – related to the due consideration of the complaint by a domestic
105 Article 20 of Protocol 14 provided that, for the first two years from its entry into force (until 31 May 2012),
the new admissibility criterion would only be applied by Chambers and Grand Chambers
106 The Hudoc research engine only hits around 40 results of inadmissibility decisions applying solely his crite-
rion, the latest of which dating back to August 2011. Later, other decisions were delivered for manifestly ill-
founded cases where the new criterion had also been contemplated.
107 Some have observed that it is paradoxical that judges have to spend time in deciding whether an applica-
tion complies with a criterion that defines applications not worthy of spending the judges’ time. S. Greer,
The New Admissibility Criterion, in The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Preliminary
Assessment and Perspectives, Samantha Besson (ed.), Schulhess, 2011, p. 45. However, it is difficult to
imagine an alternative to deal with applications.
108 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, cit.,
point 9 (c).
109 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Izmir Declaration, cit., point
F(2-b)37
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)tribunal – inviting the Committee of Ministers to adopt a related amending instru-
ment.110 It is at least questionable whether the Declarations have actually been
followed in this regard.
It has been pointed out that during the first years after the entry into force of the new
criterion, its implementation required more, rather than less, time and consideration
from the Court, which delivered extensively motivated judgments with a view to
developing legal principles for its application.111 Once Protocol n° 15 will have
entered into force, however, it will introduce the modifications advocated by the
Brighton Conference, thus widen the scope of applicability of the significant disad-
vantage criterion by eliminating one of its ‘safeguards’. The Explanatory Report to
the Protocol points out that the amendment is intended to give greater effect to the
principle that the Court should not be concerned by trivial matters.112
In a report of 2012 on the effects of Protocol n° 14 and on the implementation of the
Interlaken and Izmir Declarations, the CDDH reported an observation by the Presi-
dent of the Court stating that the great majority of cases which might fall to be dealt
with under the new provision would be declared inadmissible more rapidly and more
easily under other criteria.113 As an observer stated, one might conclude that both
the fears and hopes that had accompanied the entry into force of the new criterion
have failed to materialize. It has not made the Court inaccessible and it has not signif-
icantly helped reducing the case overload. Its deterrent effect towards dubious appli-
cations is also questionable. Its implementation by single judges would probably
make a difference, although, on the other hand, it would make the application of the
legal principles less visible, as single judge decisions are usually not published.114 One
can only speculate as to why this is so in circumstances where the costs of electronic
publication are extremely limited.
Other commentators have pointed out that that the very nature of the criterion is
quite discretionary and that the related case law is quite unsubstantial. On that view
it is no surprise that it has been used to adjudge a minimum percentage of the total
applications.115
110 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, cit.,
point 15.
111 A. Buyse, Significantly Insignificant? The Life in the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35 § 3 (b)
ECHR, in B. McGonigle Leyh, Y. Haeck, C. Burbano Herrera, and D.Contreras Garduno (eds.), Liber Amicorum
for Leo Zwaak, Intersentia 2013, forthcoming), p. 12.
112 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/213.htm.
113 CDDH report containing elements to contribute to the evaluation of the effects of Protocol No. 14 to the Conven-
tion and the implementation of the Interlaken and Izmir Declarations on the Court’s situation, available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/CDDH-DOCUMENTS/CDDH(2012)R76_Addendum%20II_EN.pdf.
114 A. Buyse, Significantly Insignificant? The Life in the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35 § 3 (b)
ECHR, cit., p. 12. The author here affirms having had confirmation form the Registry that, at the beginning
of March 2013, 127 decisions had been taken on the basis of article 35, paragraph, 3, letter b) of the
Convention, 68 of which solely based on the criterion.
115 S. Greer, The New Admissibility Criterion, cit.38
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)The strict wording of the provision as emerged from Protocol n° 14 has been alleged
to be the main cause of the failure of the criterion.116 This situation may change once
all the State Parties ratify Protocol n° 15.
The European Law Institute, too, has noticed the exiguous number of applications
decided through this criterion. Consequently, even if recourse to it increases in the
future, one has to be prudent about expecting an enormous impact on the
caseload.117 The very need for the existence of the clause had been put into
question.118
With or without the amendment of Protocol n° 15, it seems that it is a matter for the
Court, rather than a direct consequence of the text of the Convention, whether the
new criterion is to be applied extensively, thereby enabling it to contribute to the
disposal of the backlog. While on the one hand the Court can use it as a tool to speed
up the disposal of the backlog of unmeritorious applications, on the other hand, its
rather discretionary nature has the potential of jeopardizing legal certainty for appli-
cants. To conclude, the results remain thus mixed until now. The benefits for the
backlog’s reduction appear limited, and there is a potential contradiction between
this rule and the wide access to human rights justice.
4.4. The Pilot Judgment Procedure
4.4.1. The measure
The Pilot Procedure was introduced to tackle repetitive applications regarding a
structural problem in the implementation of the Convention in the State Parties. It
was not until the end of the 1990s, when the number of State Parties and related
applications started to increase that the Court started to notice such trends. In
particular, the length of proceedings in the Italian judicial system and the non-execu-
tion of judgments by many of the states created out of the former Soviet Union were
the cause of the filing of a high number of applications. 119
The first judgment which presented a structure that, although was not directly called
in this way, would become typical of the Pilot Judgment was Broniowski v.Poland,
delivered in June 2004 (shortly after adoption of Protocol n° 14). The case concerned
a compensation scheme for Polish citizens displaced after World War II from regions
east of the River Bug, and involved almost 180 applicants.120
116 See J-P. Costa, Les réformes de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, op.cit., p. 32.
117 European law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 19.
118 European law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, cit., p. 44.
119 See L. Wilhaber, Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems, in The European Court of
Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, Max-Planck Institut für
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, R. Wolfrum and U. Deutsch eds., 2009., p.69-70
120 Broniowski v.Poland, [GC], n° 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V-(22.6.04).39
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• The finding by the Grand Chamber of a structural problem, involving a group of
individuals, concerning the respect of the rights guaranteed by the Convention
• The conclusion that such deficiencies in national law and practice could be the
basis of a high number of connected applications
• The recognition and indication of concrete general measures to solve these prob-
lems
• A decision (which is in fact not found in all cases) to adjourn consideration of
other pending applications deriving from the same cause
• The use of the operative part of the judgment to reinforce the obligation to take
legal and administrative measures
• Reserving the issue of just satisfaction (Article 41 of the Convention)
• Information by the Court to the Committee of Ministers, General Assembly and
Human Rights Commissioner on the procedure adopted and further develop-
ments.
• A common practice at the end of the Pilot Procedure for the Court to support the
agreement of a friendly settlement and strike out the remaining applications.
Although the Court would have preferred this solution,121 Protocol n° 14 did not
provide for a Convention level legal basis for the Pilot Judgment. A dedicated Rule 61
was inserted in the Rules of Court and came into force on 31 March 2011. It provides
that the parties shall be consulted before the start of the procedure and that the Court
shall identify in the judgment the remedial measures the State is required to take. It
may also impose a time-limit on the adoption of such measures and that any friendly
settlement must also cover general measures and redress for other/potential appli-
cants. In adddition, where a State fails to abide by a pilot judgment, the Rule provides
that the Court will normally resume its examination of the adjourned cases.122
4.4.2. The results
According to the Court’s statistics, after a peak in 2009, use of the pilot judgment
technique has reduced the total number of judgments delivered, whilst increasing
the number of applications dealt with.123
The procedure has not been spared from criticism, principally as regards the non-
fixed criteria for the choice of the “leading” application and more generally for the
121 L. Wilhaber, Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems, cit., and, in general for the Pilot
Judgment Procedure: D. Haider, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights, cit.
122 M. O’ Boyle, The future of the European Court of Human Rights, German Law Journal, 12 German Law
Journal 1862-1877 (2011), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=
1388.
123 Overview 1959-2013 Echr, European Court of Human Rights/ Council of Europe, 2014, available at http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592013_ENG.pdf.40
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rather than by reference to the facts of individual cases124. Some commentators have
also argued that, although a successful initiative to reduce one aspect of the case
overload, the Pilot Procedure is insufficient to solve the problem of repetitive appli-
cations.125 These should be resolved primarily at national level, by resolving the
structural problem, or at least by introducing effective remedies to allow cases to be
dealt with internally.126
During his speech on the occasion of the opening of the 2013 judicial year, the
ECtHR’s President pointed out the importance of the Pilot procedure in that it allows
an analysis of an underlying systemic – or structural – situation that is at variance
with the Convention. Following this analysis, the Court may give guidance to the
State on suitable remedial measures.127 He affirmed that the use of Pilot Judgments,
more intense than ever in 2012, was one of the factors contributing to reducing the
backlog 2012.
The Court further commented, at the end 2014, on the issue of systemic problems by
way of response to a Report of the Steering Committee of Human Rights.128 It
reported that in some State Parties, such as Romania, Serbia, Italy and Turkey,
internal remedies had been established to allow applicants to seek redress for
systemic issues at national level. For instance, in Turkey, a constitutional complaint
procedure as well as a compensation commission for damages arising from excessive
length of proceedings had been introduced, which allowed the Court to declare
thousands of applications inadmissible for non-exhaustion of internal remedies.
4.5. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations
4.5.1. The measure
Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations are two instruments to resolve
disputes before the European Court of Human Rights that constitute an alternative
to judgments.
124 S. Wallace, Much ado about nothing? The pilot judgment procedure at the Europen Court of Human Rights,
E.H.R.L.R., 2011, 1, p. 71-81, and D. Haider, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human
Rights, cit., p. 239.
125 European Law Institute (ELI) Statement on Case-Overload at the European Court of Human Rights, 2012,
available at http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/S-1-2012_
Statement_on_Case_Overload_at_the_European_Court_of_Human_Rights.pdf.
126 See, ex multis, Press conference, President Dean Spielmann, Strasbourg 29 January 2015, available at:
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150129_Press_Conference_2015_FRA.pdf; Analysis of
Statistics 2015, Council of Europe, January 2015.
127 Available in the 2013 annual report: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2013_prov_
ENG.pdf
128 See Response of the Court to the “CDDH report containing conclusions and possible proposals on ways to
resolve the large number of applications arising from systemic issues identified by the Court”, ECHR, 20
October 2015, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2014-ECHR_response_CDDH_report.pdf.41
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been amended by Protocol n° 14 in order to encourage such type of conflict resolu-
tions. The Court can place itself at the parties’ disposal for the purpose of facilitating
friendly settlements at any stage in the proceedings, not only after the application
has been declared admissible, as had been provided for prior to the amendment.
Rule of Court 62 is dedicated to this procedure, although this rule, last amended in
2012, continues to provide that a declaration of admissibility is required in order to
trigger the friendly settlement procedure.
In practice, the Chambers or their Presidents enter into contact with the opposing
parties, taking any steps that appear to be appropriate to facilitate a friendly settle-
ment. Negotiations are confidential and without prejudice to the arguments in the
contentious proceedings. When a friendly agreement is achieved, the Court, after
having verified that respect for human rights is guaranteed, issues a strike out
decision. However, when the agreement is limited to a claim of just satisfaction, the
Court will issue a judgment. As provided by the amended Article 39 of the Conven-
tion, the Committee of Ministers supervises the execution of friendly settlements, as
an exception to the rule that the Committee of Ministers is only competent for the
supervision of the execution of judgments.
The instrument of Unilateral Declarations was introduced in 2001 via case-law,
Article 37, paragraph 1, letter c) of the Convention providing the legal basis for the
strike-out decision. Where an applicant refuses the terms of a friendly settlement
proposal, the responding government may file a request to strike out the application
and make a public and adversarial (unlike the confidential friendly settlement) unilat-
eral declaration acknowledging the violation of the Convention and undertaking to
provide the applicant with redress. Requests can be made in absence of a previous
attempt to reach a friendly settlement in exceptional circumstances only. When the
Court considers that the proposal affords respect for human rights, it may strike the
application out of the list, in whole or in part, even though the applicant wishes the
examination of his case to be continued. The procedure is governed by Rule 62A of
the Rules of Court, introduced in 2012.129 In the Tashin Acar judgment130 the Court
elaborated some clear acceptance criteria for unilateral declarations.
It is uncertain whether the infringement procedure can also apply with regard to
these instruments, as Article 46 of the Convention refers only to judgments and not
to decisions. The Court has recalled that the Committee of Ministers is competent for
the execution of friendly settlements and final judgments. In case the government
would not respect the terms of a unilateral declaration, the Court can decide to
129 Rules of Court, European Court of Human Rights, 1 January 2014, Registry of the Court, Strasbourg, avail-
able at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf.
130 Tashin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objection) [GC], no. 26307/95, 6 May 2003, see, in particular, point 67 of
the judgment.42
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Convention.131
4.5.2. The results
Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations are often used to provide a satisfac-
tory outcome to repetitive cases132 in areas of well-established case law; in
particular, as an outcome of the pilot judgment procedure. It is quite hard to get
precise data on the friendly settlement and unilateral declaration provisions. The
number of the former has been in the range of 400 to 800 from 2007 to 2011,133
rising to 1,303 and 1,481 in 2012 and 2013 respectively, with a new record having
been achieved in 2014, with almost 1,700 friendly settlements. Whilst the number of
unilateral declarations has decreased in recent years, being 703 in 2011, 606 in 2012
and 409 in 2013 their number increased again to 502 in 2014. These data must, of
course, be read together with the data for the number of applications decided.
Concerning the impact on the case overload, the data in our possession do not allow
for a thorough analysis, but it can be observed that friendly settlements and unilat-
eral declarations have constituted 3.7% in 2014, 2% in 2013 and 2012, and 3% in
2011 of the total of the applications disposed of. They reached 10% of the applica-
tions disposed of in 2015. During that year, while the number of friendly settlements
slightly decreased, the number of unilateral declarations multiplied almost six times.
If one considers that most of the applications are inadmissible, it makes for a huge
percentage of meritorious applications. Also, they allow for a speedy disposal of
cases, especially useful in repetitive applications.
At the Interlaken Conference, within the framework of repetitive applications, State
parties were called, with the support of the Court, to facilitate friendly settlements
and unilateral declarations.134 Even more intensely, the Izmir Declaration invited
them to give priority to the resolution of repetitive cases by way of friendly settle-
ments or unilateral declarations and encouraged the Court’s role in this respect as
well as the need for creating awareness of friendly settlements as an integral part of
the Convention system.135 Finally, the Brighton Declaration was silent with respect
131 Ivaylo Kraev v. Bulgaria, application n. 43007/04, Committee Decision (Fifth Section –UD), October 2010, p.
in fine.
132 H.Keller and D. Suter, in their study ‘Friendly Settlements and Unilateral Declarations’ (in The European
Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, Samantha Besson (ed.),
Schulhess, 2011, operate a distinction between mass procedures and repetitive (‘clone’) cases. The former
refers to way in which cases are processed: mergers of several applications originating from different fact
stemming from the same problem. Whereas, according to the authors, repetitive (clone) cases refer to the
content of applications, those in which a systemic or general problems are dealt with at the same time.
133 They were 389 in 2007; 670 in 2008; 479 in 2009, 415 in 2010; 829 in 2011.
134 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration,
op.cit., point D, 7.
135 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Izmir Declaration, op.cit.,
point E, 143
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recourse to these measures alternative to litigation.
Some observers expressed the view that ‘mass procedures’ are now an indispensable
tool to resolve similar cases efficiently and could theoretically be exploited by appli-
cants to circumvent the significant disadvantage criterion. 136 It may be observed that
this inference would be correct only if the Court took a more favourable approach
towards use of the new criterion. On the other hand, friendly settlements and unilat-
eral declarations can be unsatisfactory to those applicants who would prefer a fully-
fledged judgment declaring a violation of the Convention. Also, the average award of
compensation for unilateral declarations and friendly settlements tends to be
substantively lower than that for the average judgement.
The same observers have underlined that the Court has a tendency to consider these
two instruments together, under the umbrella of ‘strike out’ decisions. Other than
the fact that the figures can be misleading as the Court could strike out also other
categories of judgments, this tendency may be misleading, as they have different
requirements. In particular, one requires the applicant’s agreement and the other
one not. They also differ from the enforcement point of view. 137
Some NGOs have called for an extension of the competence of the Committee of
Ministers to the enforcement of unilateral declarations.138 This could maybe make
this procedure more efficient.
4.6. Priority Policy
4.6.1. The measure
In 2009, the Court amended Rule of Court 41, concerning the order in which it deals
with applications, by introducing a Priority Policy. Until that time, cases had been
processed and adjudicated mainly on a chronological basis. The priority policy is
based on importance and urgency of the issues raised. It leaves the possibility to the
Chambers or their Presidents to derogate from such criteria to give priority to a
particular application.
The Policy introduces different categories for the allocation of the applications.
Categories I-III are the top priority applications (urgent / structural or endemic
questions and issues of general interest / Articles 2,3,4 and 5§ 1 respectively).
Category IV is composed of Chamber cases which do not fall within the top three
136 H.Keller and D. Suter, in their study ‘Friendly Settlements and Unilateral Declarations’, op.cit.
137 H.Keller and D. Suter, in their study ‘Friendly Settlements and Unilateral Declarations’, cit.
138 The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Unilateral Declarations under the supervision fo the Committee
of Ministers, available at: http://www.europapraw.org/en/news/apel-o-poddanie-jednostronnych-
deklaracji-etpcz-nadzorowi-komitetu-ministrow.44
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)categories and which cannot be classified as repetitive applications; Category V
covers repetitive applications and Categories VI and VII are inadmissible applications.
Thus Category VII applications are dealt with by a Single Judge. The policy concen-
trates more resources on the most important cases, being the most serious and
those disclosing the existence of problems capable of generating large number of
additional cases.139
4.6.2. The results
The Court has been somewhat inconsistent in the application the Priority Policy in
the first years of its introduction. This makes it useful to briefly examine the annual
data.140 Precise data on the first six months of application (second half of 2009) are
not available. Nonetheless, it can be affirmed that the situation of priority applica-
tions by the end of 2010 was not ideal, despite the fact that the number of applica-
tions dealt with within these categories had increased by 68%. For example, 21% of
Category I “urgent” applications had been pending for more than one year and 64%
of Category II applications were awaiting a first examination.
In 2011, the Court extended its efforts on the first three category-cases, increasing
the number of applications dealt with by 5%. The number of applications in these
categories concluded by friendly settlement or unilateral declaration also rose from
40 in 2010 to 146. At the end of 2012, the amount of pending priority applications
was around 6,600, an increase by 30%, compared to the previous year, of applica-
tions that had been dealt with. 61% more priority applications were declared
inadmissible or struck out. Out of the total number of judgments delivered, 33%
were priority ones. In 2013 the trend changed, as the number of priority applications
dealt with decreased by 14%, and the number of priority applications giving rise to a
judgement decreased by 5%. Those concluded by friendly settlement or unilateral
declaration went from 158 to 247. As of 31 December 2014, there were 7.380 top-
three category cases pending, not a big difference compared to the 7.520 of the
previous year.
At the end of 2015, the top three category cases amounted to 11, 400, that is to say
almost 18% of the total number of pending cases.141 As their number continues to
rise, they are one of the main current challenges before the Court. However, the
positive aspect is that the number of priority cases dealt with at different stages of
the proceedings increased by 10%: moreover 37% more priority applications were
communicated to the respondent governments.142
139 See The Court’s Priority Policy, European Court of Human Rights, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Priority_policy_ENG.pdf.
140 The following data are available on the respective Analysis of the statistics documents, available on the
website of the Court: http://www.echr.coe.int/sites/search_eng/pages/search.aspx#{“fulltext”:[“analysis”]}.
141 See Analysis of the Statistics 2016, ECHR, January 2016.
142 Ibidem.45
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)The table below presents the situation of pending cases by priority category in 2015.
The Court has a wide margin of manoeuvre in its application of the Priority Policy,
which can sensibly influence the volume of pending applications and the ratio of the
various categories within them. For example, in 2011 fewer judgments were deliv-
ered, but the focus was given to the top three categories, which was quite the
opposite of what happened in 2013. In 2014, there was again an increase in dealing
with the top three categories. The outcome of the implementation of the priority
policy has to be read in conjunction with the introduction of new formations. While
they seem to have different scope, these two reforms in fact complete each other.
With the introduction of the single judge formation and the new competences of the
three judges committees, judges have more time to dedicate to more serious issues.
In 2014, almost half of the high priority (Category I to III) applications originated from
two States: Russia and Romania, Turkey being third on this unflattering podium. Also,
almost half of the cases are part of the “Brighton backlog” which, despite the
increase in by 30 of the number of cases disposed of in 2014, has increased by 16%.
In 2015, 35% of the top three category cases were to be considered as “Brighton
backlog”. These cases take precedence over all others and more resources are
dedicated to them.
The comments on this new policy have been quite positive overall.143 In particular, it
is seen as potentially beneficial for the quality of the judgments and for their consist-
Chart 4. The Court’s total caseload by priority category
Source, Analysis of Statistics 2015 ECtHR
143 See, iner alios, L. Wildhaber, Criticism and case-overload: Comments on the future of the European Court of
Human Rights cit. p. 14.46
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)ency.144 However, there have also been warnings over the fact that the policy could
risk diverting resources from the high volume of non-meritorious, non inadmissible
cases, which have become a major issue.145
There have also been proposals to push the principle much further, allowing judges
to decide that some of the applications, given their low priority, should be struck out
by applying Article 31, paragraph 1 of the Convention – something similar to a certi-
orari procedure (see infra, part 6).146
4.7. New Rule of Court 47
4.7.1. The measure
On 1 January 2014an amended Rule 47 requiring stricter conditions for applying to
the Court came into force.
The first major change introduced concerns the application form that every applicant
has to complete on filing an application.147 A simplified version of the form is
published on the Court’s website and can be downloaded. Any form sent to the Court
must be completed in full and accompanied by copies of the relevant supporting
documents, including, when an applicant has a representative, the power of attorney
or from of authority signed by the applicant. The Court may reject any incomplete
application.
The second major change concerns the interruption of the period within which an
application must be made to the Court, that is, six months from delivery of the final
decision of the highest domestic court with jurisdiction to rule on the matter. For the
period to be interrupted, the application will now have to fulfill all the conditions set
out in Rule 47.
During its first year of application, Rule 47 served as a basis for striking out half of the
total of 25, 100 applications disposed of administratively, a figure that doubles that
of the previous year; quite an effective measure then. President Spielmann has taken
the trouble to explain that applicants whose applications are rejected under the
144 P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload: Preserving the Mission of
the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit., p. 20
145 P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload: Preserving the Mission of
the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit., p. 20
146 European Law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, cit.,
recommendation C. 1); P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload:
Preserving the Mission of the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit., p. 25
147 The application form requires information on the applicant’s data, a statement of the facts, an explanation
of the alleged violation of the articles of the Convention, the exhaustion of domestic remedies, any lis
pendens before other international jurisdictions. It is downloadable form the website of the Court (http://
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=applicants&c=#n1365511805813_pointer).47
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)application of Rule 47 are fully entitled to apply again.148 This is true, provided that
they are still in time! Also, the Court has pointed that the rule, far from being meant
to discourage new applicants, fosters a sense of responsibility that should lead to
higher standards of excellence.149
4.7.2. The results
In fact, in 2014, 23% of new applications (almost one quarter of the total) failed to
comply with the Rule 47. In 2015 the number of cases disposed of administratively
increased by 29%, reaching 32, 400. Of these, 45% were disposed of under Rule 47.150
The most common grounds of rejection are the failure to submit complaints, to
provide relevant documents, to provide a statement of violations; to provide
documents showing that the domestic remedies have been exhausted151. These
deficiencies seem to be (simply) symptomatic of the lack of a legal assistance, or
more generally, of legal literacy, notwithstanding that the individual application is
one of the cornerstones of the whole system.
One could therefore wonder whether the Court has gone too far with the strictness
of this new Rule and risks not addressing serious violations committed against people
which, because of illiteracy or any other reason, are unable to complete the applica-
tion form. This probably explains why, as the Interlaken and the Courts Report 2014
state, some exceptions to the application of Rule 47 have been made.152 Indeed, the
Court considers still necessary to clarify the application requirements to potential
users, pointing out the most common mistakes.
As regards the interruption of the six-month period, as the Court says, it does not
appear to have led in any increase in the rate of rejections for failure to comply with
the six-month limit.
In general, the Court affirmed that Rule 47 is an efficient tool, able to make the
processing of applications easier and faster, and an efficient filter for vexatious or
non-serious applications. As a result, more time can be dedicated to more important
cases.
148 Press conference, President Dean Spielmann, Strasbourg 29 January 2015, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150129_Press_Conference_2015_FRA.pdf.
149 Foreword, Provisional Annual Report 2014, ECHR 2015, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf.
150 Analysis of the Statistics 2015, ECHR, January 2016.
151 Source: Interlaken Process and the Court (2014 report), European Court of Human Rights, 28 January 2015
152 Ibidem.48
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4.8.1. The measure
Protocol n° 14 introduced the possibility for the Committee of Ministers to lodge an
application against State Parties that are not compliant with a judgment of the Court.
Article 46, paragraph 4 of the Convention provides that if the Committee of Ministers
considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a final judgment in a case
to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party and by decision
adopted by a majority vote of two thirds, refer to the Court the question whether
that Party has failed to fulfill its obligation.
4.8.2. The results
Although this possibility was introduced as “the most important” amendment in the
context of execution by the explanatory memorandum to Protocol n° 14,153 it had
not been put into practice at the beginning of 2016, possibly due to political reasons.
Commentators have argued that, if put in practice, this could be a very powerful tool
to solve some of the systemic problems afflicting the Convention system and
hopefully provide a strong deterrent to recalcitrant State Parties.154
4.9. Seconded lawyers
4.9.1. The measure
A number of arrangements have been made between the Court and the States
Parties, some promoted by the EU-funded and Brussels-based European Judicial
Training Network, for the secondment to the Court of senior lawyers and judges.
The Committee of Ministers’ Resolution (2012)2 of 15 February 2012 governs
secondments for longer than one year.155 This practice had been encouraged during
the Interlaken Conference, when States were incited to second national judges and,
where appropriate, other high-level independent lawyers to the Court Registry. 156
From 2009 to 2015 around 65 people have worked as seconded lawyers, enrolled
within a scheme with a professional training dimension.157
153 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm, point 15.
154 See E. Lambert Abdelgawad, L’exécution des jugements: les requêtes en manquement et en interprétation,
in The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives,
Samantha Besson (ed.), Schulhess, 2011, p. 93 et ss; F. Tulkens, La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme
et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la reforme et penser à l’avenir, cit., p. 313
155 See: Information Note from the Registrar, secondment to the Registry of national lawyers, 8 October
2012,European Court of Human Rights, available at: http://www.ucps.sk/subory/informat__vna_n__ta.pdf.
156 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, cit.
157 Interlaken Process and the Court (2015 report), European Court of Human Rights, 12 October 201549
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)In 2015 there were overall fewer seconded lawyers than in the previous year, mainly
explained by the fact that many of them departed after having achieved the objec-
tive of their secondment, in many cases dealing with the backlog of Single Judge
cases from Russia.158
4.9.2. The results
Seconded lawyers have obviously helped to reduce the backlog. This must be
integrated in a more general increase of human resources (see § 4.11). The use of
seconded qualified personnel by the State Parties is of course something positive.
One must however get guarantees concerning, precisely, the required qualifications.
It represents a very flexible instrument, easy to implement when needed, and easy
to dismantle when it has become superfluous.
4.10. E-justice policy, dissemination and other “soft measures”
The Court has been very active in developing both easier ways of communication
with parties and dissemination of information on the ECHR system, in the most
complete, rapid and accessible way possible.159
In 2015, a new platform for secure sites used by the governments for communicating
electronically with the Court has been launched, hoping to reach 44 State Parties. At
the same time, a platform for electronic communication with applicants was being
tested. Written pleadings and other documents can already be filed electronically.
Parties can now check on the current procedural state of applications. In addition,
the Court has opened a twitter account which also hosts its press release. Hudoc is
now available on mobile devices and is translated in Russian and Turkish; wider
functionalities have been added to the portail. The Practical Guide on admissibility
criteria is at its third edition in 20 languages and is being regularly updated, and so
are case law guides and a series of topic-specific manuals and factsheets. In addition,
the Court has drawn up an IT strategy document identifying priorities and expected
results for the period 2016-2020.
The HRTF (see § 2.2) project of translation of case-law to be included in Hudoc has so
far allowed for something like 3,000 translations in 12 target languages (it has been
decided that the project will be funded for a fourth year).160 In addition, different
stakeholders have been invited to include in Hudoc all translations available, which
158 Interlaken Process and the Court (2015 report), European Court of Human Rights, 12 October 2015
159 See, in general, Interlaken Process and the Court (2014 report), European Court of Human Rights, 28
January 2015 and Interlaken Process and the Court (2015 report), European Court of Human Rights, 12
October 2015.
160 The beneficiaries have so far been: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Molova,
Montenegro, FYROM, ibidem.50
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)has led to a total of 12, 500 documents. The Registrar in 2014 repeated the proposal
that State Parties consider translating the most important and Europe-wide relevant
decisions each year.
Training sessions and study seminars have also been organised, again with the help
of the HRTF, for judges and lawyers, in particular those coming from states where
this is more needed. The Court also tries to develop and maintain dialogue with State
Parties, at high government or judicial level.
All these actions contribute concretely to the awareness of the ECHR system among
those concerned and therefore indirectly to its correct functioning.
4.11. Increase of human resources
After all these changes, one must mention that the Registry’s human resources have
increased quite substantially. In 2000, there were 274 agents, representing an
expenditure of more or less 15 million euro. In 2007, this had increased to 549
agents, costing 35 million euro and, in 2015, 660 agents costing 49 million euro.
Some of these resources have obviously been needed to deal with the enormous
workload brought by the enlargement of the Council of Europe. Others have been
justified by the backlog. Regrettably, the amount of information about this essential
topic remains limited, though it is absolutely essential for a management analysis.
A special way to finance this has been, as proposed during the Brighton Conference,
a special bank account of the Court. It has been opened in order mainly to finance
the recruitment of jurists to deal with the backlog and the most high priority cases.161
The account is open for voluntary donations by State Parties, which may be subject
to the condition that the funds are used for specific purposes. At the end of 2015, a
total 2,806,600 euros had been collected from 22 State Parties, about 78% of which
have been spent on hiring additional expert lawyers for two years. More lawyers are
to be hired should the Court receive more contributions.162
161 Ouverture d’un compte spécial pour la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Communiqué de presse du
Greffier de la Cour, CEDH 266 (2012) 21.06.2012.
162 Interlaken Process and the Court (2015 report), European Court of Human Rights, 12 October 201551
5. GLOBAL RESULTS
In a press release of 24 October 2013, the Registry of the Court informed that the
methods employed since the entry into force of Protocol n° 14 had succeeded in
reducing the backlog of cases; the number of pending applications was around 96,
000 whereas in 2011 it had reached its maximum of above 161, 000. This positive
trend has continued since then, the number of pending applications reaching the low
of 64, 850 at the end of 2015. Most remarkably, in 2015 the backlog of single judge
cases had been absorbed. Inadmissible cases can now be dealt with speedily and the
Court’s resources dedicated to other challenges. These figures show how in a few
years the Court has made a tremendous improvement.
On the occasion of the formal opening of the year on 30 January 2014,163 President
Spielmann affirmed that the backlog of manifestly inadmissible applications
concerning a number of State Parties, such as Turkey, Romania and Poland, has been
eliminated. Others, such as Germany and France, no longer have backlog, and it was
supposed to be the same for Russia in 2014 (though this may no longer be valid,
having regard to the events linked to the Ukrainian crisis). The Court intended to
dispose of its backlog of single judge cases by the end of 2015.164 As a matter of fact,
according to President Raimondi’s presentation in 2016, at the end of 2015, there
were 64,850 cases pending. They included 11,500 priority cases, 19,600 normal
cases, and 30,500 repetitive cases165.
A positive element is that, while in the latest years the number of incoming applications
has become quite stable (which is in itself a positive figure), the number of closed cases
had increased by almost 6% – an equation that results in a decrease in the backlog. At
the end of the 2013, the Court had dealt with more or less 93, 000 applications, around
80, 000 of which through single judge formations, a slightly smaller number as
compared to the previous year. In 2014 the number of applications disposed of
amounted to around 86, 000, slightly less than in 2013, but the ratio of single-judge
decisions in this figure dropped by 69%. In 2015 this was even more striking. Allocated
applications dropped by 28% and the number of single judge decisions fell by 62%.
The backlog of single judges cases being absorbed, the filtering section, will, as
explained previously, be also charged with the treatment of repetitive cases,
following the ‘one in-one out’ methodology. In addition, a new ICT system is being
deployed to make the WECL procedure speedier.166 It is however not so likely that
163 Conférence de presse, cit.
164 Press conference, President Spielmann, Strasbourg 29 January 2015, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Speech_20150129_Press_Conference_2015_FRA.pdf.
165 Press conference 28 January 2016.
166 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf. See Speech of President Raimondi,
Press conference, 28 January 2016, available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_
Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf.52
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)this positive trend will keep the same pace in the long run, as it is mainly dependent
on the disposal of simple cases. Once they have been ruled, it will be harder for the
Court to dispose of such a high number of applications.167 Concerning repetitive
cases, they currently amount to more or less half of the pending cases (30,500 out of
64,850). The new WECL working methods, allowing for such cases to be dealt with
rapidly yet thoroughly should allow the Court to clear this backlog in the next two or
three years.168
The current challenges are thus the high priority cases, the number of which unfor-
tunately continues to rise. So does the Brighton backlog169. Similar issues appear for
non-priority, non-repetitive cases: they mainly originate from just four states, and
their Brighton backlog has been increasing. They were around 19,600 at the end of
2015.170 Clearly, some very impressive improvements have been made, but the
ECtHR has not yet completely eliminated the backlog.
Such an impressive improvement was obtained thanks to numerous measures. The
creation of the Filtering Section, the new criteria on inadmissibility, the single judges,
the ICT improvements and the various ways of personnel increase all played a role.
Most interestingly, their coordinated implementation provided some added value.
This bring us back to a fundamental conclusion: increase of means must imperatively
be associated with a reform of process. Otherwise, there is a substantial risk of losing
a good part of the benefits brought by the increase of means.
167 D. Spielmann, The successes of and challenges for the European Court, seen from the inside, in Proceed-
ings, Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights, Oslo, 7-8 April 2014,
available at: http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/Publications/Proceed-
ings-Oslo-2014.pdf, p. 42 ss.
168 CDDH report on the longer-term future of the system of the European Convention of Human Rights, 11
December 2015, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/GT-GDR-F/
CDDH(2015)R84_Addendum%20I_EN-Final.pdf.
169 According to the Brighton Declaration (para 20(h)), the ECtHR should deal with all incoming applications
within one year of registration, either by rejecting it or communicating it to the Government, with a further
target of terminating the proceedings within another two years. The “Brighton Backlog” comprehends all
applications not dealt with in line with these criteria.
170 See Speech of President Raimondi, Press conference, 28 January 2016, available at: http://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20160129_Raimondi_JY_ENG.pdf.53
6. OTHER POSSIBLE FUTURE REFORMS
In that framework, other measures for the handling of the applications by the ECtHR
have been proposed or debated but not (yet) adopted. One of the advantages of a
serious and open preparatory process is that a lot of propositions are advanced. In
October 2012, August 2013, January 2015, and October 2015 respectively, the Court
published the reports called “The Interlaken Process and the Court”, as a follow up
to the international high level conferences.171 These documents mention a series of
supplementary measures that the Court could adopt in the future. First, of course,
changes should be expected as a consequence of the entry into force of Protocols n°
15 and 16 to the Convention. The impact of the reforms introduced by these two
Protocols will be largely dependent on the way in which the Court itself, and the
national jurisdictions, approach them. Again, none of this was evoked only once in
the EU debates.
6.1. A default judgment procedure
The 2012 report mentions that the Court’s ‘Standing Committee on Working
Methods’ had been tasked with looking at a possible default judgment procedure.
Reference is made to the Brighton Declaration, which advocated for a new form of
procedure involving the determination of a small number of representative applica-
tions. This suggestion emerged at a time when the Court had received many
thousands of individual applications against Hungary concerning pension entitle-
ments. According to the 2012 report, the outcome of this proposal will depend on
the will of State Parties and the Committee of Ministers to respond to the Brighton
Declaration. However, the 2013 report explains that rather than on on this default
judgment procedure – as it calls it – the Court had in fact focused on streamlining the
procedure for repetitive cases as much as possible, in particular regarding non-
enforcement cases against Ukraine.
This kind of procedure has been also presented by the European Law Institute’s
statement of 2012. It envisaged a process whereby, in the wake of a pilot judgment
finding a violation, the Court would, without the usual examination of cases taken to
judgment, transmit repetitive applications to the Committee of Ministers by means
of a formal “default” judgment. Such judgment would be dealt with by the
Committee and the respondent State in the framework of the general measures of
execution of the pilot judgment that shall be adopted at national level. The legal basis
of this could be set either by a modification of the Rules of Court or, if necessary, by
amendment of the Convention.172
171 Both available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/reform&c=.
172 European Law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, cit.,
recommendation B (1).54
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)This procedure would in other words include the treatment of repetitive applications
as part of the process of execution of the pilot judgments, which comes within the
remit of the competence of the Committee of Ministers – not of the Court. It would
be possible considering that Article 41 of the Convention, on just satisfaction, does
not impose an obligation, but rather a possibility for the Court to afford just satisfac-
tion. The proposal reflects the observation that respondent States are in any event
obliged, in executing a pilot judgment, to introduce national remedial measures
assuring reparation for the victims of the systemic violation found in the pilot
judgment itself.173
A dedicated drafting group under the authority of the CDDH (GT-GDR-C) finally
adopted, in January 2013, a report which concluded that, under the current circum-
stances, there would be no significant added value to designing and introducing a
representative application procedure. In particular, they found that the procedure
would have a negative impact on the right to individual petition, since one case
would have res iudicata effect on other applications. It also wouldn’t produce any
advantage compared to the pilot procedure. On 30 April 2013, the Ministers’
Deputies endorsed such conclusions and recommended that, at that stage, no
further action be taken at inter-governmental level.174
6.2. A new filtering mechanism
Already in 2006, the group of Wise Men envisaged the possibility of establishing a
new filtering mechanism, with the admonition that it should not, however, consti-
tute a mere replica of the old European Commission of Human Rights. They foresaw
a mechanism which would be attached to – but separate from – the Court. This had
to guarantee, on the one hand, that individual applications result in a judicial
decision and, on the other hand, that the Court be relieved of a large number of
cases, enabling it to focus on its essential role. This body would be called the “Judicial
Committee”. It would, in particular, perform functions which, under Protocol n° 14,
are assigned to committees of three judges and single judges. The members of the
Judicial Committee would be judges enjoying full guarantees of independence. Their
number should be smaller than that of the State Parties and reflect a geographical
and gender balance, and should be based on a system of rotation between states.
The term of office of its members would be limited in duration in accordance with
rules to be laid down by the Committee of Ministers.175
173 See P. Mahoney, The European Court of Human Rights and its Ever-growing Caseload: Preserving the
Mission of the Court While Ensuring the Viability of the Individual Petition System, cit.; see also L. Wild-
haber, Criticism and case-overload: Comments on the future of the European Court of Human Rights cit.
p. 14.
174 Information available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/GT-GDR-C_en.asp.
175 Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, cit.55
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)The idea of a new filtering mechanism was discussed during the Interlaken Confer-
ence. In that occasion, it was suggested to the Committee of Ministers to examine
the setting up of a filtering mechanism within the Court going beyond the single
judge procedure and the procedure provided for within the existing bench.176
In 2011 the CCDH reported, inter alia, about the possibilities for enhanced filtering
mechanisms within the Court and the treatment of repetitive applications. It was
specified that not all of the 47 members of the CCDH were convinced of the necessity
of a new filtering mechanism. One of the possibilities on the table was that of
appointing senior Registry lawyers to be responsible for filtering, possibly under the
supervision of a judge. This hypothesis could present the disadvantage of reverting
to a system similar to that in place before the entry into force of Protocol n° 11. Such
filtering decisions have an administrative rather than judicial nature. Other possibil-
ities were evoked: to entrust filtering to a new category of judges, exclusively
dedicated to this task; or, inspired by the ad litem judges mechanism of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to appoint temporary judges, with
the same task and status as the incumbent ones.177 Other proposals put on the table
comprise that of entrusting the filtering of applications which are inadmissible for
procedural reasons to registry lawyers, and those whose inadmissibility lies on
reasons based on the merits to judicial figures.178
Luzius Wildhaber, former President of the Court, also analysed other possibilities,
such as allocating seconded national judges to the task of filtering. For him, these
solutions, along with the one of the appointment of national judges, would imply a
consistent expenditure of resources, considering in particular the staff that should
assist these new figures. In his view, whichever new mechanism is created, it should
be given the mandate to declare a higher number of cases inadmissible, thus
allowing the Court to consolidate the existing edifice and focus on its main mission,
which is the promotion of the overall effectiveness of human rights in all State
Parties. One way to foster this trend would be to make wider use of the significant
disadvantage criterion: the Court should not be stuck to deal with trivial issues. Mr.
Wildhaber proposed to set up a conference to draw the organisational chart of a new
ECtHR which would decide or discard all cases within a year, discussing what the real
cost of rendering prompt justice would be.179
176 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, cit.
177 CDDH Interim Activity Report, Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), CDDH(2011)R72 Addendum I,
Strasbourg, 1 April 2011, Council of Europe, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/
Interim_Activity_Reports/CDDH_2011_R72%20Add%20%20I%20-%20CDDH%20Interim%20Activity%20Re-
port%20_ECHR%20amendment%20measures.pdf.
178 Open Society Foundations, The ‘Filtering’ Debate, ECHR Reform 5, Fact Sheets: Reform of the European
Court of Human Rights, February 2012, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/
files/echr5-filtering-20120227.pdf.
179 Luzius Wildhaber, Filtering Mechanisms, in The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14, Prelimi-
nary Assessment and Perspectives, Samantha Besson (ed.), Schulhess, 2011 p. 203-.56
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)Michel O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar of the ECtHR, expressed the view that some unpop-
ular decisions should be taken for the sake of expeditious justice, such as seeking to
staunch the flow of hopeless cases – by imposing fees or obligatory legal representa-
tion – and/or by improving its filtering capacity by either empowering the Registry
lawyers to act as ‘assistant judges’ or by creating a judicial filtering body composed
of ‘junior’ judges creating an additional section. For him, only profound changes
could be capable to free the Court up to examine more serious applications.180
The European Law Institute proposed to give mandate to the Steering Committee for
Human Rights to monitor the need to create a separate filtering mechanism.181.
Some NGOs have pointed out that the need for an additional filtering mechanism
should only be faced in case it would be established that all the measures deployed
so far are actually not sufficient to cope with the overload of applications. Given the
encouraging results of the latest years, where the unmeritorious applications are no
longer a threat, this reflection is particularly pertinent nowadays.182
As per the treatment of repetitive applications, means to improve effectiveness in
their handling are being tested. For example, the possibility to entrust such kind of
applications to any possible new filtering mechanism has been put forward, but
there seems to be general consensus on the need for them to be dealt with by Judges
and not by registry officials. All of the proposed options would have to comply with
budgetary constraints, the options involving the Registry only would of course have
a lighter impact than those implying the appointment of further judges.183
It has to be pointed out that a separated filtering mechanism, as compared to the
existing mechanism of the Filtering Section composed of Single Judges, would
probably imply a more time-consuming disposal of the cases, as the immediate possi-
bility of the single judge to directly struck out or declare inadmissible the cases would
be wiped out. From the point of view of speed, it is thus not necessarily an improve-
ment.
It also must be emphasised that the right to have one’s individual applications adjudi-
cated upon has been put into question by some commentators. Alternatively, it has
been proposed to make it more difficult to file an individual application, for example
through the introduction of fees or making the representation by a lawyer compul-
sory. This is why the need for reiterating the centrality of the individual application
within the Convention system has been felt by the international conferences and the
supporters of that approach.
180 M. O’Boyle, The Future of the European Court of Human Rights, cit. p. 1870-1871.
181 European law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the European Court of Human Rights, cit.
182 Open Society Foundations, The ‘Filtering’ Debate, cit.
183 CDDH Interim Activity Report, Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), CDDH(2011)R72 Addendum I,
Strasbourg, 1 April 2011, Council of Europe, cit.57
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It has been even debated whether some kind of certiorari procedure should be intro-
duced, where the Court could select which applications to determine and which
not.184 The proposed procedure would be enshrined in a binding legal text, and
would operate either through an extensive application of the striking out provision
of the Convention, Article 37§ 1(c), or by a Treaty amendment where the judges
would be allowed to decide that an application is not of such a nature to warrant
adjudication on the merits.
Former President Wildhaber expressed the wish for a radical reform featuring a two-
track structure where the current system would apply to certain categories of very
important cases, such as those alleging the most serious violations of the Convention
rights, the balance of the cases being subject to a “leave to appeal” system, in which
a limited number of cases would be speedily decided.185 This would however need a
preliminary analysis of the cases in order to establish the level of importance.
He even suggested that tailor-made-country-specific solutions should be adopted, in
order to face the fact that, for many years, 60 to 70% of the applications emerge from
a handful of States. Politically, of course, this would be extremely difficult to
negotiate in the framework of the Council of Europe.
6.4. Judicial Fees
In a report addressed to the Committee of Ministers in 2010the Steering Committee
for Human Rights analysed the possibility of imposing fees or charges on applicants.
This was meant to respond to a call for measures that would contribute to a sound
administration of justice launched at Interlaken. The report investigated the feasi-
bility and advantages and disadvantages of fees, deposit or penalty systems.186 The
Court in a position paper before the Izmir Conference adopted on 4 April 2011
expressed its opposition to fees but seemed to be open to the idea of compulsory
184 See, in particular, the proposal of the European law Institute (ELI) Statement on case-overload at the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, July 6th 2012, available at http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/p_eli/Publications/S-1-2012_Statement_on_Case_Overload_at_the_European_Court_of_
Human_Rights.pdf. Proposal (C) Otherwise meritorious applications, number 2; and its comment by M
Francis Jacobs in the foreword, p. 8-9. It has been strongly criticized by F. Tulkens, la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la réforme et penser à l’avenir, in Cahiers de droit
européen, 2012, n° 2, p. 339-340, who said this would go against the sense of history.
185 L. Wildhaber, Rule of law: “Constitutional Court” or “guardian of individuals”?, in Proceedings, Conference
on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights, Oslo, 7-8 April 2014, available at: http://
www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/Publications/Proceedings-Oslo-2014.pdf,
p. 92 ss.
186 CDDH first report on Implementation of the Interlaken Declaration, Steering Committee on Human Rights,
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 18 June 2010, CDDH(2010)010 Addendum I, available at http://
www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/Interim_Activity_Reports/CDDH_2010_010%20Add%20I%20-
%20CDDH%20first%20report%20on%20implementation%20of%20the%20Interlaken%20Declara-
tion%20FINAL%20EN%2018-06-10.pdf.58
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working languages was not even discussed.187 The Izmir Declaration contained a call
to continue to examine the issue of charging fees to applicants and other possible
new procedural rules or practices concerning access to the Court.188 Noticeably, the
Brighton Declaration already underlined at its point 2 that the right to individual
application is the “cornerstone” of the system of the Convention.
These issues can well be inserted in the increasingly popular debate over which
should be the main role of the ECtHR. This debate puts on the table two seemingly
mutually exclusive determinations: a constitutional court or a court for the individ-
uals.
6.5. More flexible revision of rules
The idea of a statute for the Court, had been discussed already in the report of the
Group of Wise Men (see supra) with a view to allowing for procedural rules to be
amended with a lighter procedure than that required to amend the Convention.
Later, in the Brighton Declaration, the Conference noted with appreciation the
continued consideration as to whether a simplified procedure for amending provi-
sions of the Convention relating to organisational matters could be introduced,
whether by means of a Statute for the Court or a new provision in the Convention,
while taking full account of the constitutional arrangements of the State Parties.189
On the other hand, the CCDH pointed out in 2011 that some issues dealt with outside
of the Convention could be suitable for an “upgrading” and be included in the text.
These are, in particular, the interim measures, the pilot judgment procedure and the
unilateral declarations; however, such suggestion was not considered a priority or
feasible in the short run.190 More recently, the report of the dedicated working group
of the CDDH has not excluded the opportunity of such an “upgrading”.191
187 See Luzius Wildhaber, Filtering Mechanisms, in The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14,
Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, Samantha Besson (ed.), Schulhess, 2011 p. 211
188 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, organised within the frame-
work of the Turkish Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Council of
Europe, 27 April 2011, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_
ENG.pdf, see follow up plan, right of individual petition. The application of fees was critised by See Luzius
Wildhaber, Filtering Mechanisms, cit p. 211, and by F. Tulkens, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme
et la déclaration de Brighton. Oublier la réforme et penser à l’avenir, p. 326.
189 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration, 19-20
April 2012, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf
190 CDDH Interim Activity Report, Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), CDDH(2011)R72 Addendum I,
Strasbourg 1 April 2011, Council of Europe, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/
Interim_Activity_Reports/CDDH_2011_R72%20Add%20%20I%20-%20CDDH%20Interim%20Activity%20Re-
port%20_ECHR%20amendment%20measures.pdf.
191 CDDH Report containing conclusions and possible proposals for action concerning the procedure for the
amendment of the Rules of Court and the possible ‘upgrading’ to the Convention of certain provisions of
the Rules of Court http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/CDDH-DOCUMENTS/CDDH%282014%
29R82-Add-I-en.pdf, Steering Committee for Human Rights, Council of Europe59
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governments, on the possible changes to the Rules of Court resulting from the entry
into force of Protocol n° 15 and eventually Protocol n° 16, as well as on the possible
introduction of a rule on consultation with the State Parties and the applicants’
representatives.192
6.6. More personnel
Regarding the budget issues, the 2015 report states that the Court has been faced
with a budgetary decision leading to a reduction of staff and that the situation could
deteriorate in 2016. It, however, pointed out that the Court needs more staff to meet
the targets in the Brighton Declaration. Apparently, the Court needed 3.75 million
euros over eight years to recruit 40 extra lawyers. The generosity of State Parties on
the dedicated bank account could become very important.
6.7. A more complete reform
The debates and reflection on the reform of the Court are not confined to academia
or International conferences. The Council of Europe has put forward a comprehen-
sive series of debates on the future of the Court and the possible paths for reform.
The Committee of Ministers is at the head of a reform process mechanism which
gives terms of reference to the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) and
the Committee of experts on the reform of the Court (DH-GDR), a specialist plenary
body subordinate to the CDDH. The work of the DH-GDR is prepared in smaller
drafting groups (GT-GDR-A to G) that deal with specific issues. In the past, other
subordinate bodies of the CDDH were also involved in the reform process. An open
consultation has been launched and a list of independent experts has been asked to
contribute.193
In particular, dedicated drafting groups were appointed for the research and
proposals in specific targets.194 The “GT-GDR-F” was required to prepare, by the end
of 2015, a report containing opinions and possible proposals concerning the longer-
192 Interlaken Process and the Court (2014 report), European Court of Human Rights, 28 January 2015.
193 Ibidem.
194 In particular:
– An evaluation of the effects of Protocol no. 14 and the implementation of the Interlaken and Izmir Decla-
rations on the Court’s situation (GT-GDR-A)
– Draft Protocol no.15 to the Convention, amending various points concerning the Preamble, the admissi-
bility criteria applicable to individual applications, the procedure for relinquishment of a case from a
Chamber to the Grand Chamber of the Court, and the age-limit for judges (GT-GDR-B)
– A possible ‘representative application procedure’ before the Court (GT-GDR-C)
– A Guide to Good Practice in respect of domestic remedies (GT-GDR-D)
– A toolkit to inform public officials about the State’s Convention obligations (GT-GDR-D)
– How to resolve applications arising from systemic issues (GT-GDR-D)
– Whether to enable the appointment of additional judges to the Court (GT-GDR-E).60
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report was then examined and adopted by the Steering Committee for Human Rights
for transmission to the Committee of Ministers.195
The report was published on 11 December 2015.196 Among many documents, it is an
exceptionally high quality one (most unfortunately, not a single one of that quality
has been presented in the European Union during four years of legislative debate
about the future of the EU courts system). It contains an introductory section
explaining all of the main changes the Court underwent since its creation, as well as
the main features of the current system. This shows that there probably is a need for
clarification and synthesis. The report then presents three sections gravitating
around the issue of authority. The first section covers the authority of the Conven-
tion mechanism and the issue of national implementation, the second the authority
of the Court itself, and the third the authority of the Court’s judgments, with a focus
on their execution and supervision. The subdivisions examine the possible responses
that can be activated within or outside the existing structures. The last chapter
tackles the issue of the place of the Convention mechanism in the European and
International legal order. The centrality of the concept of authority catches the
attention. It is linked to the fact that the implementation of the Convention system
as a whole, rather than the functioning of the Court itself, is what is at stake.
Regarding the backlog issue, the Group observed that the number of pending appli-
cations had decreased, thanks to the application of Rule 47 as well as the new
national effective remedies. It welcomed the absorption of the single judge cases
backlog and stressed the importance of dealing with the other categories of cases. It
pointed out that, as noted by the Registrar, the challenge at stake regards the two
objectives of clearing the backlog and handling the annual influx of cases, which
require different answers due to the fact that they are of different nature. The
backlog clearance is a temporary issue while the annual influx is a permanent
challenge. Concerning the second aspect, it stressed, among others, the responsi-
bility of legal representatives for providing the applicants with adequate information
and underlined the need to foster co-operation within the legal professions.
The report mentions the experiment of a “project focus approach”, according to
which, for some of the larger countries, cases have been allocated to lawyers special-
izing in certain areas of the Convention. The result of such experiments remains to
be seen. A specialization of the Registry lawyers is consequently examined. This thus
concerns the lawyers, not the Judges. As the backlog is absorbed, more resources can
be dedicated to treating the annual influx. However, for the Group, it remains crucial
to address the root causes of the high influx of cases in the first place.
195 See: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/DOCUMENTS-GroupF_en.asp.
196 CDDH report on the longer-term future of the system of the European Convention of Human Rights, 11
December 2015, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/GT-GDR-F/
CDDH(2015)R84_Addendum%20I_EN-Final.pdf.61
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procedure. The Group found that the positive results of the latest years weaken the
need for such a solution. It also questioned its discretionary character and pointed
out that it could lead to a lack of legitimacy. It also reaffirmed the centrality of the
role of individual applications. Very interesting is also the part of the report where
the Group stressed the importance of maintaining the ability to revise working
methods to respond to circumstances, in particular through the participation of State
Parties. It regrets that State Parties are not always consulted thoroughly when it
comes to amending Rules of Procedure.
A dedicated section of the website of the Council of Europe is publicly available.197
These web-pages focus on intergovernmental work on the reform of the Court since
the Rome Ministerial Conference of 2000, which led to Protocol n° 14 and a series of
non-binding instruments. They cover notably the 2006 Report of the Group of Wise
Persons and the successive High-level Conferences on the reform of the Court that
took place between 2010 and 2012 at Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton, and follow-up
to these events, including the adoption and opening for signature in 2013 of Proto-
cols n° 15 and 16.
197 http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/CDDH/REFORMECHR/.62
CONCLUSIONS
These conclusions are divided into two parts. The first covers the specific character-
istics of the challenges before the ECtHR. The second endeavours to draw some
lessons from the ECtHR’s experience for the reform process of the EU courts. As
mentioned at the beginning, there are important differences between the two
systems. However, from the point of view of judicial management and reform
management, many of the problems remain substantially the same.
A. Lessons for the European Court of Human Rights
Considering the specific characteristics of the challenges before the ECtHR, there is
clearly a fundamental problem of implementation. After 1989, the Council of Europe
underwent enormous and simultaneous changes. The organization was enlarged to
include a number of new states many of which were confronted with serious human
rights issues. At the same time the scope of the protection of human rights was being
enlarged. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR became mandatory. Taken together these
changes provoked a kind of perfect legal storm. The heterogeneity (political, legal,
economic, linguistic…) of the State Parties is clearly much greater in the ECHR system
than in the EU. Additionally, the ECHR lacks efficient sanction mechanisms. The
“pathology” of some State Parties’ behaviour can thus be much greater, and may
provoke huge waves of applications. Judgments may be implemented weakly, and
the saga never stops. There can be no complete solution without a better implication
of State Parties in implementation of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Hence the impor-
tance of the Brussels Conference conclusions, of the enhancement of the role of the
Committee of Ministers, and of the development of dialogue between the ECtHR and
the courts of the State Parties.
From 2000 to 2012, the number of applications before the ECtHR rose from 10,000
to 65,000. During the same period, the number of pending applications went from
16,000 to 162,000. Of course, the repetitive nature of many applications in part
represented an artificial inflation of numbers. This evolution was nevertheless an
enormous institutional shock. What the ECtHR has managed to do in this extremely
difficult context is most impressive. A catalogue of the examined and adopted
measures during the last 15 years could provide a classic example of judicial reform
in all State Parties.
The ECtHR is not yet out of the woods, but it has made essential progress. Some
systemic problems remain and recent developments in Russia, Ukraine and Turkey,
for example, are unlikely to reduce them. Important structural reforms may yet be
needed, possibly encompassing a greater role for the Council of Ministers, a new63
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on essential legal challenges.
Furthermore, there also remains a strong potential tension between access to justice
and judicial efficiency. The fundamental question is simple: how much are the
authorities prepared to pay to provide a system for 800 million people where every-
body, without legal assistance, can sue any Member State for any violation of human
rights? This admirable concept cannot be sustained without at the very least corre-
sponding financial resources, if not occasional concessions of state sovereignty. Until
now, the system has managed to adapt remarkably well. It has strongly improved its
performance while compromising very little on its essential objectives.
How was this done? The process deserves a lot of attention. There was a lot of
technical preparation. A good reform in depth first requires a good reflection in
depth. This pays in the long term. Such a reflection allows for the development of a
global and long term strategy. There is otherwise a great risk of taking short term
decisions, the global and long term consequences of which are not fully understood.
Consultation was also very broad, and transparency very great. This also pays in the
long term. It improves the quality of reflection. Autocratic managers usually see
debates as a loss of time. However, especially for complex reforms, it is the absence
of debate which at the end leads to a loss of time. Managerial measures were imple-
mented before there was any large increase of personnel. This is essential, since
huge increases of personnel can impede the efficacy of managerial measures.
Additionally, such increases of personnel as were implemented were progressive and
targeted. This is also essential, since it allows one to draw lessons from experience.
Managerial reforms take time, trial and error, and adjustments. Some increases of
personnel were also flexible in that they were targeted and temporary. The Registry
was expanded while the question of any increase of the number of judges was put
on the backburner. This also was essential, because in an international context it is
most difficult to provide for a limited increase in the number of judges (let alone a
temporary increase). Furthermore, increasing the number of judges develops the
most unstable part of the machine, which is not propicious for long term produc-
tivity198.
Had the ECtHR followed after 2000 the counter-example of the CJEU, it would be
now saddled with 94 human rights judges, which would be much more difficult to
coordinate, and would lead to higher costs, greater inflexibility and a more unstable
structure.
198 For the sake of clarity, this was precisely what had been recommended by the author for the reform of the
EU courts in 2011: see The reform of EU courts (I), § 3. One does not need to be a rocket scientist to draw
such basic conclusions. What is amazing is the total inability of all EU institutions involved to simply open
such a reflection process.64
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Comparing the reform process in the Council of Europe and in the European Union,
a lot of basic lessons immediately catch the eye. Some of them concern the prepara-
tion of the reform, others its substance.
B.1. Weaknesses of process
The reform of the ECtHR was far better prepared than that of the CJEU. In the former,
a lot of conferences were organized and a lot of propositions debated. Many experts
were consulted. External contributions were even warmly encouraged. None of this
happened at any stage in the EU. The preparation process was much more open in
the case of the ECtHR than the EU. A lot of stakeholders were consulted in the ECtHR
process. Nobody was consulted in the CJEU process. Not the lawyers (despite conse-
quences for the appeal system), nor the national courts (despite potential conse-
quences for the system of preliminary rulings), nor the social partners (particularly
the trade unions directly concerned by the suppression of the Civil Service Tribunal),
nor the academic world. Additionally, the General Court’s opinion on its own reform
was not only neglected, but it was deliberately hidden from the legislative authori-
ties. Thus apart from the Court of Justice, the rest of the world was treated as if it
could have no opinion on the issues raised: a thoughtless zone.
The ECtHR process was far more transparent. A lot of documents, external and
internal, were put at the disposition of the public. None of this happened in the CJEU.
The simple comparison between the two courts’ websites is quite striking. Even after
five years of legislative proceedings, no part of the CJEU’s web site refers to them.
There is not even a single preparatory document in the public domain. Observers
have been reduced to making requests for access to administrative documents under
Article 15 § 3 TFEU. This absence of transparency is especially surprising, even
paradoxical, since the CJEU possesses the right to initiate legislation in the EU legis-
lative process, whereas the ECtHR does not possess such a right in the context of a
revision of the ECHR199. Its transparency obligations are thus greater.
All this led to many elementary realities simply not being considered. To give a simple
illustration, although the alleged objective of the CJEU’s reform was to reduce delays
in the time required to deal with cases, no one in the four EU institutions involved
paid the least consideration to the limited number of hearing weeks. In the CJEU,
199 One cannot resist here urge the urge to quote the excellent judgment of the Court of Justice in Turco (C-39/
25 P). “Increased openness… enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision making process and
guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable
to the citizen in a democratic system. Those considerations are clearly of particular relevance where the
Council is acting in its legislative capacity […]. Openness in that respect contributes to strengthening
democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the basis of a legislative
act. The possibility for citizens to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondi-
tion for the effective exercise of their democratic rights” (points 45-46).65
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weeks during which hearings are not held. With additional days of leave, one could
conclude that the EU courts do not hold hearings during fourteen weeks at the year
(over three months). This obviously does not lead to accelerated judicial proceed-
ings200.
This weak preparation is quite surprising in a legislative process having a huge consti-
tutional impact. To give a point of comparison, during the previous reform of the EU
Court of Justice’s statute in the framework of the Nice Treaty, the Court of Justice
had provoked a serious and open preparatory debate. Moreover in theory the trans-
formation of a traditional Treaty negotiation process into a legislative ought to have
had the opposite result. The new reform process thus reflects a deterioration of the
management ability of the European Court of Justice, and generally of the other EU
institutions.
B.2. Weaknesses of substance
Considering the substance of the reform, the ECtHR depth of preparation allowed for
the evaluation and comparison of a lot of different measures. It also allowed many
possible managerial measures to be adopted before embarking upon any increase of
personnel, notably an increase in the number of judges. The open, transparent and
progressive process allowed for a serious evaluation of the results of the reforms
(although the statistical analyses might be improved).
Postponing increases of personnel has also constrained the actors to an in depth
reflection about the evolution of the ECtHR system that was designed to operate in
a different context. In such a context, can some functions be automated? Can some
be entrusted to the Registry? Can some be entrusted to single judges? Can some be
sent to smaller chambers? Can the capabilities of personnel be improved? None of
this reflection happened in the CJEU framework.
Limited and reversible increases of personnel allowed the Council of Europe to
explore whether that solution was productive and the extent to which it was. In an
international context, an increase in the number of judges risks creating enormous
political problems (as revealed by the excruciating debate in the EU). Furthermore, it
develops the most unstable component of the court, which is detrimental to produc-
tivity and reduces the benefits of any training. Additionally, it is also the most inflex-
ible solution, since it is impossible to reverse in the case where there is a reduced
200 Another benefit of a serious preparation would have been to revisit useful memories from the past. Before
1989, the Court of Justice had sought to create a limited Court of First Instance consisting of a few judges.
The Member States refused to do this and imposed one judge per state. In 2002, the Court of Justice had
proposed to add six additional judges to the EGC. That request was refused exactly for the same reason.
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” (Santayana).66
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)workload. Finally, it is by far the most expensive solution. This does not mean such a
solution must never be contemplated. However, it means that it should be contem-
plated only once all of the others have been fully explored.
ICT also deserves to be mentioned. Obviously, the ECtHR’s system has been devel-
oped to support the structural changes to the Court’s functioning. This concerns
especially the creation of the Filtering Section and of the new regime limiting admis-
sibility. It is interesting that this system’s quality has led to its progressive use in other
fields of Council of Europe competence. The CJEU’s ICT system does not meet by far
the same standards.
Needless to say, in the legislative process, the Commission, the Council, and finally
the Parlement also failed to explore the available alternative, more productive, and
less costly measures. The doubling of the judges is thus a collective failure of the EU
institutions system. It led to the creation of the largest international court in the
world to deal with what remains a limited amount of cases201. Worse, the mistakes
of the past tend to provoke new ones. From 2011 to 2015, the Court of Justice
underlined persistently the need to increase as quickly as possible the number of
judges, even when the size of the backlog was diminishing. From 2015, reality
brought it to furnish other justifications202. In 2016, new justifications were still
presented. The Court of Justice’s president indicated that doubling the number of
judges was designed to provide for a “more committed bench”203 (though such an
absence of commitment had never been mentioned before, least of all estab-
lished204.) Simultaneously, he also explained that doubling the number of judges
was meant to facilitate a transfer of competence to hear preliminary references to
the General Court205.
These statements are in complete contradiction with the original justification for the
reform. In 2011, the Court of Justice had precisely explained that it was indispensible
201 To give an idea of the new resources brought by the 2016 reform, in 2002 the EGC closed 411 cases with 15
cabinets comprehending 30 legal secretaries. To maintain the same ratio should mean that 56 cabinets
comprehending 224 legal secretaries close at least 1646 cases per year. In 2015 881 cases were filed in the
EGC. Additionally, the number of onerous competition cases has fallen and nearly 50% of the caseload now
consists of what are acknowledged to be more straightforward trademark cases (and this without even
considering other factors, like ICT for example).
202 See The reform of the EU Courts II, § 5.1.1.-5.1.2.
203 M. Newman, EU court revamp will spark more antitrust appeals to deeply committed bench, Lenaerts says,
MLex, 17 June 2016. An additional problem in that regard is that precisely those cases tend now to disap-
pear, as M. Newman had indicated previously: Bottleneck eases at EU court, as new judges prepare to
arrive, MLex 9 February 2016.
204 See the valid observations of Judge A. Collins, The General Court: Enlargement or Reform?, King’s College,
Annual Law Conference, 11 March 2016.
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/index.aspx).
By way of example, the judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2014 in Intel (T-286/09) comprehends no
less than 1647 paragraphs. The translation of its final version in all EU languages took more than one year to
complete. One wonders what type of additional “bench commitment” is to speed up that process, and how
it could be managed.
205 M. Newman, Lower EU court could field national questions, interpret law, says Lenaerts, MLex, 20 June
2016.67
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specialized courts206. Now, having provoked the abandonment of specialized courts,
it proposes to separate appeals and prejudicial rulings, without any reflection in
depth, or any consultative process. This approach increases again the risk of adopting
additional piecemeal and ill-conceived measures.
As already indicated by the author in 2011, essential reforms of the judicial system
require a global and long term preliminary reflection207. In the present context, this
requires a lot of questions to be answered. (1) Is the Court of Justice itself in diffi-
culty? Until now this did not seem obvious. It has approximately 750 cases per year,
adjudged by 28 judges and 11 Advocate Generals (each with a cabinet of 7
persons)208. To give a point of comparison, the cabinets’ resources are five times
bigger in the European Court of Justice than in the US Supreme Court. At first sight,
it does not seem that the workload is five times heavier. These 39 cabinets also have
recourse to an administrative service of the institution to deal with part of their
judicial work209. Until now, the only real reason that seems to justify a possible
transfer of jurisdiction to hear preliminary rulings to the EGC is... the need to justify
doubling the number of the latter’s judges. (2°) If the Court appears in difficulty, one
needs first to examine possible managerial changes. (3°) If these managerial changes
are insufficient, one needs then to examine the available options, and make a serious
analysis of each of them. (4°) If, and only if, the transfer of some prejudicial rulings to
the EGC appears to be the best option, one must then examine the modalities of such
a transfer. It is obviously difficult to distinguish between different kinds of prelimi-
nary rulings and the need for coordination between the two competent courts would
increase.
The long term view can bring precious insights on any reform. It is of interest to note
that, in 2004, there were 30 judges’ cabinets in the entire institution. In 2016, there
are 86 cabinets (95 in 2019!). This more or less multiplies the number of judges and
advocate generals by more or less 200% in 12 years (together with a corresponding
and an additional growth in the number of legal secretaries). In the meantime, the
number of cases appears to have increased by approximately 70%. This does not give
the appearance of overworked cabinets (especially with the progress of ICT). On the
other side, since 2003, the increase in the size of the administrative services was far
more modest (at less than 70%).
206 See The reform of EU courts I, § 4.
207 See The reform of EU courts I, § 2.
208 Recent internal reforms have made greater use of Advocate Generals in the judicial treatment of cases,
though it remains to be seen whether this is the best use of that resource.
209 See The reform of EU courts II, § 5.3.1.
One must also examine which cases are serious ones. In the Court of Justice, as in the General Court, a
number of cases are not in fact dealt with, since they are manifestly inadmissible or unfounded. For
example, in 2015, 94 cases of the EGC were closed immediately without any communication to the
defending party. 111 were additionally dismissed for other reasons.68
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there has been an enormous expansion of judges’ (and advocate generals’) cabinets.
The development of the administration has been more limited. In the administration,
additionally some areas have seen the creation of too many top jobs210. In a nutshell,
the CJEU saw a huge mechanical expansion of cabinets and a rise of top jobs, but an
insufficient development of the administration, an evolution which is a very good
recipe for more costs and less results. The usual caveat about Mexican Armies
applies. The doubling of the General Court risks aggravating this imbalance.
Seen in that perspective, the strategy of the ECtHR can largely be considered as a
model. Reflection in depth in an open, inclusive and transparent process. Evaluation
of many possible managerial measures. Implementation of managerial measures
first. Limited targeted, and reversible increases of personnel, that allow for regular
feedback. Priority largely given to more stable and less expensive personnel, which
allows for more investment in new capabilities.
The doubling of the size of the EU General Court offers a perfect counter-example.
No reflection in depth. As far as the process is concerned, no open, inclusive and
transparent preparation (an initial weakness aggravated by the inability of the
Council and the Parliament to bring any additional relevant input). This was
compounded by the refusal to provide the General Court’s opinion about its own
reform to the Parliament and the Council (for instance can one imagine in a similar
context the Commission refusing to communicate to the Parliament and the Council
the Agency for Pharmaceutical Products’ opinion about its reform in depth?). The
latest evolution of the backlog was also not communicated to them. Additionally, the
Court fed the legislature with strongly debatable information in unsigned, unregis-
tered and undated documents.
As far as the substance of the reform is concerned, immediate priority was given to
the most expensive and irreversible increase of personnel. Simultaneously, over the
years, limited, reversible and less costly increases of personnel were adamantly
refused, in spite of the “urgency”, though such increases did not require a heavy
legislative procedure and were successively proposed by (a) the Commission, (b) the
Parliament and (c) the Council. The possible development of the Registry’s role was
utterly neglected. And so were any connections with the development of the ICT
system. All this brings to a manifestly excessive increase of judges, with the collateral
damage of destabilising the cabinets’ personnel. This is worse than basic manage-
ment by numbers. This substitutes apples for pears, unstable apples for stable pears,
and costly apples for less expensive pears.
210 The recent example of creation of a new director position (the second rank in the EU administration) to
manage a service of four persons refers (see The Reform of the EU Courts II, § note 120).69
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)This does not prevent some observers from deploring the persistence of occasional
judicial delays. “How is it possible, they ask, that the press and some judges indicate
they sometimes do not have work when cases are not dealt with?211“ These people,
like many judges, tend to have a “judgo-centric” vision of the world. This will be easily
understood by the readers of our previous reports. Making judgments, especially in
an international, unstable and multilingual court, is a complex process. If you want
to obtain results, you need to study all components of the process. Otherwise, you
can perfectly have a strong increase of input (and doubling a court is certainly a
massive one) without obtaining a strong improvement of output. This is precisely
what the author recommended in 2011 and was not done during four years by the
EU institutions212.
The final observation is that, in spite of their functional and geographical proximity,
there seems to have been absolutely no collaboration in reflection between the
ECtHR and the CJEU. Considering that there already had been a very impressive high
quality reflection in 2010 in the ECtHR about the backlog, one can but wonder why.
For an unsophisticated observer, all this could give the impression that all EU institu-
tions involved took essentially care of their own corporatist interest. For the Court of
Justice, this could be seen firstly an opportunity to abolish the specialized courts, and
also to obtain a lot of additional resources, thanks to a persistent invocation of
“urgency” though it was in fact diminishing in an attempt to preclude all serious
debate. It could be said that this also circumvented the constraints of the budgetary
interinstitutional agreement aimed at reducing the number of personnel in all EU
Institutions. For the Commission, this proposal could allow to deepen the synergy
with the Court while simultaneously killing any development of specialized courts.
The experience of the Civil Service Tribunal showed that such courts tend to control
the Commission’s decisions in a stricter way. For the Council, the aim seemed to
allow the Member States to appoint as many people as possible, even at the price of
huge expense and destabilization of the Court. This also facilitated greater interven-
tions in the internal functioning of the General Court213. The Parliament alone earned
nothing in the game, behaving in fact like a simple second chamber of the Member
States. It is telling that almost all “government” parties more or less supported the
doubling of the General Court, whereas most “opposition” ones voted against.
Worse, the Parliament spent a lot of time… finding reasons to explain why there was
no time to organize an impact assessment. It reached a glorious compromise, also
211 See various press sources in The reform of EU courts II, § 5.3.1. Add Die Press, Gericht: Richter fürchten,
Daumen drehen zu müssen, 25 May 2016.
212 2016 has provided new interesting insights about the management aspects of the problem. For example,
six judges will not be renewed (and possibly seven). Most of these judges have been left in the dark by their
national government about their renewal during many months (though a letter had already been sent
about the need for certainty in time by the EGC to the Member States in March 2015). Among these judges,
one will have remained only six years, one three years and a half (and one… possibly ten months), in a court
where heavy judicial proceedings may take four years.
213 See The reform of EU courts II, § 5.3.5.70
THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS (III)against all principles of public finance, that an audit would be conducted on the need
to spend money… after the money had been spent. In the whole story the Parliament
appears as a particularly pathetic guardian of the public purse. Nowhere in the
history of the European Union can one find such a consensus of its institutions to
support a manifestly excessive spending against the express request of the authority
concerned (i.e. the General Court).
This evolution, alas, only amplifies previous ones. The doubling of the judges of the
General Court has now become the new symbol of a generally obese EU institutional
system. The Treaty of Nice had already produced an obese Commission, and the
Treaty of Lisbon more obese institutions (Parliament, Court of Auditors and even the
Central Bank). The EU now also has an obese Court of Justice. The primacy of
representation over efficiency has led to a system where the top tier of each institu-
tion is manifestly excessive compared to its tasks (sometimes at the detriment of the
other tiers). This not only costs much but also makes these institutions more difficult
to manage. It is high time that the leaders in charge of European affairs remember
the immortal words of Mies van der Rohe. In EU politics, as in management or archi-
tecture, “less is more”.
One can but hope that in the future the whole decision process will be reformed to
prevent the repetition of such saddening events, and that the example of the
European Court of Human Rights will become the example to follow.71
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